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1. Proclamation No. 6827, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,491, 49,491 (Sept. 21, 1995) (President Clin-
ton quoting George Washington Carver in a Presidential Proclamation of National Histori-
cally Black Colleges and Universities Week). President Clinton praised the Historically
Black Colleges and Universities for their commitment to empowering the minority com-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Krystle Bernal was guaranteed a better future by the admissions repre-
sentatives at Westwood College.2 They preyed on her desire to better her
life, goading her into enrollment by "telling her that if she could not com-
mit to Westwood, then she was not committed to improving her future." 3
Alisha Montgomery enrolled at Everest College after seeing a television
commercial boasting a ninety percent placement rate and a promise that
she would obtain medical certification upon program completion; several
years after graduation she has neither a job nor certification.' Recruiters
from Everest College told Tierra Alexander the externship provided by
Everest leads to a job almost one hundred percent of the time; but after
Tierra completed the externship, the employer told her that they never
hire Everest students because "they don't have the right skills."' Chelsie
Miller responded to an Everest advertisement and enrolled with assur-
ances that classes would provide her with medical experience and that the
credits would transfer to a pre-med degree at the University of Utah.6
Having obtained her degree from Everest, neither the University of Utah
munity and encouraging the American Dream. Id. The one hundred and three schools
confer twenty-seven percent of the undergraduate degrees to Blacks in the United States,
yet they only represent a mere three percent of the enrollment of all postsecondary institu-
tions. Id.; cf NAT'L GrR. FOR Enuc. STArISTIcs, PROFILE OF UNDERGRADUATE STU-
DENTS: 2007-08, 60 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010205.pdf
(determining in Table 3.2 that 14% of college undergraduates are Black, yet Black students
represent 24.8% of enrollment in for-profit colleges). This disparity highlights the signifi-
cance minorities play in for-profit college enrollments.
2. Class Action Complaint at 23, Bernal v. Burnett, No. 1:10-cv-01917, 2010 WL
3940944 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 11, 2010). In addition, Ms. Bernal was informed that as many
as ninety percent of graduates found a job within three-to-six months after graduating. Id.
She was also led to believe that this high rate was due to Westwood's contacts with those in
the fashion merchandising industry. Id.
3. Id. Ms. Bernal enrolled in a three-year Fashion Merchandising program, at a
quoted cost of $45,000, with expectations of a $65,000 salary. Id. After entering the pro-
gram, Westwood increased tuition on multiple occasions, each time causing Ms. Bernal to
make the decision: either complete the degree by taking out more loans, or abandon her
academic pursuit while maintaining liability for loans already incurred. Id. at 24-25. Upon
graduating with honors, Ms. Bernal's student loan liability equaled $75,000. Id. at 25.
4. Class Action Complaint at 17, Montgomery v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., No. 10-ch-
50281, 2010 WL 4815908 (Cir. Ct. Ill. filed Nov. 23, 2010).
5. Id. at 17-18. Tierra Alexander attended Everest based on promises contained in
television advertisements. Id. at 17. After graduating in September 2008, Everest College
"failed and/or refused to place Tierra Alexander in a job and she is not employed." Id. at
18.
6. Complaint at 20, Miller v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., No. 100918220,2010 WL 4815908
(D. Utah filed Sept. 24, 2010). Even when confronted about the issue of transferring cred-
its, Everest told her "the school was 'fully accredited,' and made express assurances that
both her degree and credits would be transferable." Id. at 20-21.
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nor Salt Lake City Community College would accept her credits from
Everest.' The stories above highlight complaints found in various class
actions.8 These students all alleged they were victims of fraud and mis-
representation perpetrated by the for-profit schools they trusted to help
them achieve a better life.9
A hallmark of the American entrepreneurial spirit is the desire to seek
out opportunities where a need exists in the market." Unfortunately,
sometimes these ventures stray from their intended purpose of meeting a
need and become tools by which businesses exploit the disadvantaged for
profit." Exploitation of the socioeconomically disadvantaged is nothing
7. Id. at 21-22. Ms. Miller left Everest with a debt of over $30,000. Id. at 24. She
alleges that Everest not only misrepresented the ability to transfer credits earned, but also
misled her regarding program costs, causing her to take out additional loans. Id. at 2.
8. Class Action Complaint at 4-5, 9-10, Bernal v. Burnett, No. 1:10-cv-01917, 2010
WL 3940944 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 11, 2010); Class Action Complaint at 17-18, Montgomery
v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., No. 10-ch-50281, 2010 WL 4815908 (Cir. Ct. Ill. filed Nov. 23,
2010); Complaint at 2,9, Miller v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., No. 100918220,2010 WL 4815908
(D. Utah filed Sept. 24, 2010).
9. Class Action Complaint at 4-5, 9-10, Bernal v. Burnett, No. 1:10-cv-01917, 2010
WL 3940944 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 11, 2010); Class Action Complaint at 17-18, Montgomery
v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., No. 10-ch-50281, 2010 WL 4815908 (Cir. Ct. Ill. filed Nov. 23,
2010); Complaint at 2, 9, Miller v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., No. 100918220, 2010 WL 4815908
(D. Utah filed Sept. 24, 2010).
10. See Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do About It,
28 Comp. LAB. L. & Po 'y J. 817, 821 (2007) (discussing the importance of entrepreneurs
in society, their psychological profile, and how governments can encourage entrepreneurial
behavior). The entrepreneur is a unique individual who has the innate ability to identify
changes in the marketplace based on changes in supply and demand. Id. Based on their
unique skills, entrepreneurs can be catalysts of change, altering how society deals with
changing needs and wants. Id. at 822. The founders of the large for-profit colleges meet
this profile. See RICHARD S. RUCH, HIGHER E), INc. 92 (2001) (asserting that for-profit
schools are centrally focused on ensuring profits in order to satisfy stockholders and realize
their business goals). They recognized a need for alternative education programs and capi-
talized on this need in underserved minority markets. RICHARD S. RUCH, HIGHER ED,
INc. 72 (2001). For example, the University of Phoenix (UOP) attributes its success to
founder John Sperling's desire to be a first mover and innovator. Bill Breen, The Hard
Life and Restless Mind of America's Education Billionaire, FAST Co., (Feb. 28,2003), avail-
able at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/68/sperling.html?page=0% 2 C2. Sperling
capitalized early on the growing trend of the adult student, online education, and, most
recently, customized e-books. Id.
11. Cf Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States:
Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. &
Poit'y REV. 785, 809-10 (2009) (describing the local and global impact of water privatiza-
tion). Water privatization is the private ownership and control of water sources for private
gain and includes management of the sources as well as distribution. Id. at 790. While the
policy of allowing private entities to control this vital resource has led to technological
enhancements of infrastructure, it has also led to increased costs and exploitation of re-
sources and the consumer. Id. at 796. The author provides a strong example of how pri-
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new in the context of predatory lending, and recently, a new threat has
emerged: exploiting Americans looking for a brighter future through
education.
Over the past thirty years, for-profit institutions of higher education
have offered individuals, neglected by traditional post-secondary schools,
the promise of achieving the American Dream through education. 1 2
Since proprietary schools became eligible for Title IV funding under the
Higher Education Act, they have used misrepresentation, fraud, and gen-
eral predatory practices in order to increase enrollments and achieve
profit." Although Congress has established roadblocks to impede the
abuses, reports persist from students who have been victimized by these
schools. This has led many to conclude that the driving force behind
these schools is the profit motive-not providing a worthwhile
education. 4
For-profit schools educate only ten percent of the students enrolled in
institutions of higher education, but these schools receive over twenty-
vate industry is exploiting a natural resource for profit to the detriment of the environment
and is analogous to the for-profit education sector. Id. at 786. While water privatization
exploits a natural resource needed for survival, for-profit colleges exploit the desires of the
underemployed for a better life.
12. Michael J. Seiden, Commentary, For-Profit Colleges Deserve Some Respect,
CHRON. oi- HIGHER EDUC., June 29, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/article-content/
46985/ (reflecting on his years as a Dean at a for-profit college and remarking on the new
opportunities these schools provide to students who are unable to attend traditional col-
leges and universities).
13. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.92-318, sec. 417B(c), § 461, 86
Stat. 235, 259-60 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (authorizing
federal financial aid to for-profit institutions offering educational programs to prepare stu-
dents for gainful employment); NAT'L CONSUMER LAw CTR., MAKING TiE NUMBERS
COUNT: WHY PROPRIETARY SCHOOL PERFORMANCE DATA DOESN'T Aoo UP AN) WHAT
CAN BIE DONE ABOUT IT 10 (2005), available at http://www.studentioanborrowerassis-
tance.org/blogs/wp-content/www.studentloanborrowerassistance.orgluploads/File/Proprie-
tarySchoolsReport.pdf (cataloging the troubled history of for-profit schools); JoI IN B. LEI3
& JAMIE P. MERISOTIs, ASHE-ERIC HIGHER Eouc. REPORT'S, PROPRIETARY ScItoots:
PROGRAMS, POLICIES AND PROSPICTS 1 (1990) (writing prior to the Higher Education
Amendments and mentioning high default and growth rates of proprietary schools).
14. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, §§ 481, 490(a), 106
Stat. 448, at 609-11, 625-27 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
(strengthening the eligibility requirement for proprietary schools under the Higher Educa-
tion Amendments). The enhancements made by the 1992 Higher Education Amendments
took steps to increase the accountability of for-profit schools by requiring that at least
fifteen percent of a school's revenue come from sources outside Title IV funds and that no
more than fifty percent of classes be offered through distance education. Id. at 610-11.
The amendments also defined the amount of credit hours or clock hours required for eligi-
ble programs and added additional requirements to the program participation agreements
(PPAs), including the incentive compensation ban discussed in Part IV of this Comment.
Id. at 611, 625-27.
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three percent of Title IV federal loans and grants.1 5 The percentage of
government payouts has doubled over the past ten years, keeping pace
with increased student enrollments.16 Significantly, over ninety-five per-
cent of for-profit students receive some type of federal student aid." Stu-
dents attending these schools graduate with more debt than traditional
students, and are more likely to default on their loans." For-profit
schools target minorities traditionally underrepresented at institutions of
higher education." They do so by placing schools in locations convenient
to students' homes or workplaces, and convenient to public transporta-
tion while developing advertising messages to appeal to these students'
desires to improve their lives.2 0
Research and hearings conducted by the Senate Health, Education, La-
bor and Pensions Committee addressed the emerging risk of student debt
and the predatory role of for-profit colleges. 2 ' These endeavors exposed
the reality that the primary goal of for-profit colleges is to make money.22
The focus on the bottom line has led to rampant fraud and misrepresenta-
tion in the for-profit college admissions processes and the exploitation of
low-income and minority students.23 Because the primary goal of a for-
profit college is generating revenue, a catch-22 has developed.
15. Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, Eouc., LABOR AND PEN-
SIONS, 111ii CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWns, SPENDING, STUDENT
DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFr HIGHER EIucATION: HEARING
BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON HEALTIH, Eiuc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 4 (Comm. Print 2010),
available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf.
16. Id. at 3. The growth of for-profit schools has been exponential with the number of
students increasing from less than 600,000 in 1998 to 1.8 million in 2008. Id. at 2.
17. NAT'L CTR. FOR Eouc. STATISTICS, PROFILE OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS:
2007-08, 109 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010205.pdf.
18. Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDuc., LABOR AND PEN-
SIONS, 111TII CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTI1, SPENDING, STUDNr
DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PRoErr HIGHER EDUCATION: HEARING
BEIOREi THE S. COMM. ON HEAL TI, EDuc., LABOR AND PENsIONs 8-9 (Comm. Print
2010), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf.
19. See Transcript of Frontline: College Inc. (WGBH Educational Foundation televi-
sion broadcast May 4, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/col-
legeincletc/script.html.
20. See id.
21. Tom HARKIN, CIIAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALThI, Eruc., LABOR AND) PEN-
SIONS, 111-HI CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIE-W OF GROw-rII, SPENDING, STUDENT
DEBT AND) UNANSWERED QUES'nONS IN FOR-PROErr HIGHER EDUCATION: HEARING
BEFiORE THE S. COMM. ON HEA tI-H, EDuc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 9 (Comm. Print 2010),
available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf.
22. Id. at 1.
23. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th
Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of Lauren Asher, President, Institute for College Access & Suc-
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To achieve a strong balance sheet, for-profit schools must continually
increase enrollments, and targeting poor individuals who are eligible for
federal financial aid is the quickest and easiest way to accomplish this
goal.24 By focusing on the bottom line, a necessity in any successful for-
profit business, these schools emphasize the number of enrollments, and
often fail to provide a quality education. 25 Schools are in a no-win situa-
tion: spending money to provide improved education will reduce profits,
and their profit motives lead schools to neglect the educational needs of
students. This Comment seeks to explain the catch-22 experienced by
for-profit colleges, address reports of fraud and misrepresentation, and
analyze the new Department of Education (DOE) regulations designed
to increase the transparency and accountability of for-profit institutions. 2 6
Part II of this Comment focuses on the business of for-profit education.
A short definition of for-profit colleges is explored in conjunction with an
analysis of the growth of the new corporate proprietary colleges. While
this Comment does not deny that for-profit education has a place in the
United States, it does call into question the methods used to attain
healthy shareholder value. Part III addresses the issues of fraud and ma-
terial misrepresentation. Using the new DOE regulations as a roadmap,
three areas are considered: (1) misrepresentation in marketing; (2) fraud
in connection with the value of the degree; and (3) fraud relating to finan-
cial matters. Each area is discussed with attention given to controlling
law, reported violations, analysis of the new DOE Program Integrity
rules, and finally, recommendations for additional actions that may be
necessary to ensure students are protected from future predatory
practices.
Part IV discusses the October 2010 DOE Program Integrity regulations
which strengthen the ban on incentive compensation for admissions rep-
resentatives at for-profit colleges. This section addresses specific exam-
ples of violations as well as legal developments in enforcement of the
cess), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Asher.pdf (examining the negative
impact of for-profit colleges on students).
24. See generally Joshua Woods, Opportunity, Ease, Encouragement, and Shame: A
Short Course in Pitching For-Profit Education, CHRON. OF HIGHER Ei)uc., Tien CII RON.
REv., Jan. 13, 2006, at 10 (using himself as an experiment, the author disguised as a pro-
spective student to for-profit colleges and Michigan State University).
25. See RiCHARD S. Rucii, HIGHER En, INc. 6 (2001) (arguing that some for-profit
universities do laudable work providing an education). It is important to note that non-
profit schools and for-profit schools are both capable of fraud and misuse of funds. Id. at 3.
26. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration Proposes Student
Aid Rules to Protect Borrowers and Taxpayers; Key Elements of Gainful Employment on
a Separate Track (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/student-aid-rules-
protect-borrowers-and-taxpayers (acknowledging that for-profit colleges are not always
preparing students for jobs).
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bans. Part V briefly considers the financial implications of the for-profit
business model, specifically the impact of the elevated student debt
shouldered by students of the for-profits.2 7 Part VI concludes by giving
an overall analysis of the DOE regulations and providing additional solu-
tions for eliminating the abuses of for-profit colleges. It must be noted
that the scope of the new regulations promulgated by the DOE is quite
broad; the analysis below focuses only on a few select areas and is not
intended to be a comprehensive review of the regulations.
II. FOR-PROFIT POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION: ORIGINS
AND PRACTICE
A. For-Profit Defined
"For-profit college," "proprietary institution," "trade school," and "pri-
vate career school" describe institutions of post-secondary higher educa-
tion providing job-focused education and skills while deriving a profit.28
Each designation is slightly different, but all are non-traditional avenues
for students to meet educational goals after graduating high school or
obtaining a GED."
References to proprietary schools originate in the 18th century.o
These small institutions provide training in fields such as cosmetology,
auto mechanics, and other trades in controlled industries.3 1 Although
these schools are not immune to the abuses addressed above and are
bound by the same federal regulations as for-profit colleges, the greatest
27. See Subprime Goes to College: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health. Educ.,
Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 1-2 (2010) (testimony of Steven Eisman, Portfolio Man-
ager, FrontPoint Financial Services Fund), available at http://help.senate.gov/imolmedial
doc/Eisman.pdf (showing that over twenty-one billion dollars have entered the for-profit
education industry from federal loans).
28. RICHARD S. RucHi, HIGHER Eo, INC. 2-3 (2001); see also JOHN B. LEE & JAMIE P.
MERISOTIs, ASHE-ERIC HIGHER Eouc. REPOR-Is, PROPRIETARY ScHooLs: PROGRAMS,
POLICIES AND) PROSPEcI'S 15-17, 25-29 (1990).
29. See JOHN B. LiE & JAMIE P. MERISOTIS, ASHE-ERIC HIGHER EDUC. RFPoRTs,
PROPRIETARY SCI oots: PROGRAMS, POLICIES AND PtosPcrs 25-29 (1990) (finding that
minorities preferred for-profit career schools over public institutions).
30. Id. at 4 (discussing the historical context and development of proprietary schools).
31. RICHARD S. RucH, HIGHER ED, INC. 3 (2001). Actual vocational schools, as they
are understood today, are a vestige of the Industrial Revolution designed purely to meet
the growing need for skilled individuals. See JOHN B. LEE, & JAMIE P. MERISOTIs, ASHE-
ERIC HIGHER EDuc. REPowrs, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: PROGRAMS, POLICIES AND
PROSPECTS 4 (1990). Modeled after the Lyceum Movement, originating in France, these
institutions provided private schooling focused on practical instruction in a specialized
trade such as mechanics or carpentry. Id. at 4-5.
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concern surrounding fraudulent behavior and abuses is attached to the
growing breed of corporate for-profit colleges.32
The term "corporate for-profit college" represents the development of
large university systems operated by corporations, both publicly traded
and closely held." The goal of these institutions is to make a profit, and
in the case of the publicly traded corporation, there is additional pressure
to increase shareholder value and maintain a high stock price.34 In order
to meet these goals, the schools pay strict attention to increasing enroll-
ment and collecting tuition." More specifically, because of the socioeco-
nomic status of the students, these schools focus on collecting Title IV
federal loans in any way possible.3 6 This has led to schools using fraudu-
lent misrepresentations and reports of schools deriving up to 88.9% of
revenues from Title IV programs.
There are currently fourteen publicly traded for-profit educational in-
stitutions." The for-profit schools most readily thought of-ITT, DeVry,
32. See Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HIEALii, EDuc., LAnoR AND PEN-
SIONS, 111TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWrII, SPENDING, STUDENT
DI7T AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFrr HIGHER EDucATION: HEARING
BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON HEAi rn, Euc., LABOR AND PENsIONs I (Comm. Print 2010),
available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdfl4c23515814dca.pdf (highlighting the
fact that for-profit institutions seek to maximize their profits first and foremost).
33. See RICHARD S. Rucii, HIGHER ED, INC. 3 (2001).
34. See id. at 95; Michael J. Seiden, Commentary, For-Profit Colleges Deserve Some
Respect, CI IRON. oF HIGIHE1R EDuc., June 29, 2009, at 80 (stating the reflection of a twenty-
five year veteran of for-profit colleges and his response to criticism of the industry).
35. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th
Cong. 2 (2010) (written statement of Joshua Pruyn, former Admissions Rep., Alta College,
Inc.), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pruyn.pdf (explaining how a job as
an admissions representative for a for-profit university was nothing more than a sales job
designed to enroll as many students as possible in the school).
36. Subprime Goes to College: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health. Educ., Labor
and Pensions, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of Steven Eisman, Portfolio Manager,
FrontPoint Financial Services Fund), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Eis-
man.pdf (articulating that for-profit schools will go to great lengths to achieve profit
through federal student loan programs); see RICHARD S. RucH, HIGiHE'R Er, INc. 97-99
(2001) (explaining for-profit schools' revenue sources).
37. See Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEAI TIH, EDuc., LABOR AND PEN-
SIONS, 1I1TI CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GRowTH, SPENDING, STUDENT
DEBT AND UNANSWERED QuEsIoNs IN FOR-PROFrr HIGHER EDuCATION: HEARING
BEFORE THlE S. COMM. ON HEAIT1r, Euuc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 4 (Comm. Print 2010),
available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf. The actual reve-
nue percentage reported to the DOE is 81.3%, reflecting the ability of schools to exclude
increased distributions of Stafford Loans from revenue calculations. Id. Congress' initial
requirement that a school must have at least fifteen percent of its revenue from sources
other than Title IV funds was reduced to ten percent in 1998, creating what is called the 90/
10 rule. Id. at 4, n.12.
38. Id. at 2.
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Sanford Brown, Kaplan University, and the University of Phoenix-are
all part of, or the parent of, publically traded corporations.39 For exam-
ple, Sanford-Brown is a business unit of Career Education Corporation,4 0
and Kaplan Higher Education (under the brand names of Kaplan Univer-
sity and Kaplan Higher Education) is owned by The Washington Post
Company.41
The University of Phoenix (UOP), often held out as the model of adult
centered education, is owned and operated by the Apollo Group, Inc. 42
For the fiscal year ending in 2009, Apollo Group reported net revenues of
four-billion dollars, ninety-five percent of which came from the operating
profits of the UOP.43 The UOP began enrolling students in 1979, repre-
senting a whole new type of university: one that banned lectures and uti-
39. See Competitors for Corinthian Colleges, Inc., ISTOCKANAjYsT.coM, http://
www.istockanalyst.com/competitor/COCO (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). Under each corpo-
rate structure, there can be numerous colleges and career training programs. For example,
Corinthian Colleges, Inc. has three brands: Wyotech, Heald College, and Everest. Our
Brands, CORINTIAN COLIS. INC., http://www.cci.edu/brands (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). In
turn, Everest College has six additional brands, such as Everest College, Everest Institute,
and Everest University Online. Id. Corinthian Colleges operates over one hundred cam-
puses in North America, enrolling in excess of 105,000 students, and offering degrees rang-
ing from accounting to massage therapy. Company History, CORINTHIAN CoiLs. INC.,
http://www.cci.edu/about/history (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). This is just one illustration of
the intricate web created by for-profit schools creating confusion amongst prospective
students.
40. About CEC, CARERI Epuc. CORP., http://www.careered.com/about-industry.aspx
(last visited Mar. 5, 2010). CEC was founded in 1994 and manages brands such as Le
Cordon Bleu North America and American Intercontinental University. Id.
41. History, WASH. PosT Co., http://www.washpostco.com/phoenix.zhtmlc=62487&
p=irol-historyl975 (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). In 2009, Kaplan reported over $2.6 billion in
revenue and managed more than seventy higher education campuses worldwide, a far cry
from its humble beginning in 1938 as a test preparation company. Building Futures One
Success Story at a Time, KAPLAN 3 (2010), available at http://www.kaplan.com/about
kaplan/companyoverview/Documents/Kaplan%20Corporate%20Brochure%202010%20-
%20FINAL.pdf.
42. RIcIARD S. Rucii, HIGHER En, INC. 28 (2001). The University of Phoenix was
founded in 1976 and became publically traded in 1994. Id.; see also JOHN SPERLING &
Ro3iRT W. TUCKER, FOR-PROFIr HIGHER EDUCATION, at ix (1997) (considering UOP as
the "exemplar" model of an adult-centered university).
43. 2009 Annual Report, Apoi-io Giu,., INC. 64, 66 (2009), available at http://
www.apollogrp.edu/Annual-Reports/2009%2OApollo%20annual%20report.pdf. The UOP
is the brainchild of John Sperling. Sperling, a man who graduated high school barely able
to read, obtained a PhD from Cambridge University before becoming a tenured professor
at San Jose State. Bill Breen, The Hard Life and Restless Mind of America's Education
Billionaire, FAST CO. (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/
68/sperling.html?page=0%2C2.
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lized a standardized peer-based learning curriculum." Critic Bill Breen
asserts that UOP founder John Sperling's goal is not to provide a quality
learning experience, but to be the world's largest for-profit university. 45
UOP achieved this through rapid growth and expansion.4 6 Advice given
to Sperling is still followed in the industry: "'find a school in financial
trouble and convince the people running it that your program will gener-
ate a profit."' 47 Because regional accreditation is a necessary eligibility
requirement for receipt of government financial aid funds, investors may
purchase an existing school that has accreditation, creating a new for-
profit institution, without taking additional steps to meet the require-
ments of the Higher Education Act.4 8
In order for for-profit schools to make a profit, they need to continu-
ally grow the student body.4 9 Unlike non-profits that have enrollment
caps, for-profit schools have endless capacity and the low completion rate
requires a high level of enrollments to balance the lost revenues.o In
reviewing the demographic make-up of these schools, it is hard not to
question whether the statistics are the result of market need, stellar mar-
keting campaigns, or underhanded practices.
44. Bill Breen, The Hard Life and Restless Mind of America's Education Billionaire,
FAST Co. (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/68/
sperling.html?page=0%2C2.
45. Id.
46. See id. (describing the "immediate financial success" of Sperling's initial program
at University of San Francisco before starting UOP).
47. Id.
48. Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR AND PEN-
SIONS, 111TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT
DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: HEARING
BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON HEAL TH, EDuc., LABOR AND PENSIONs 2 (Comm. Print 2010),
available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf; see Higher Educa-
tion Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(14)(B)-(C) (2006) (laying out steps that allow a purchaser of
a for-profit school to avoid acquiring new accreditation); see also Transcript of Frontline:
College Inc. (WGBH Educational Foundation television broadcast May 4, 2010), available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/etc/script.html.
49. See RICHARD Rucli, HIGHER ED, INC. 95-97 (2001) (indicating that "[i]n the for-
profits, the admissions offices are basically sales organizations, and the admissions staff is
made up of salespeople.").
50. See Edited Transcript of Frontline: College, Inc. (Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/interviews/mellow.html (interview with Dr.
Gail Mellow, President, LaGuardia Community College); see also Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) (testimony of Lauren
Asher, President, Institute for College Access & Success), available at http://
help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Asher.pdf.
51. See RICHARD S. Rucii, HIGHER ED, INC. 72-73, 95-97 (2001) (analyzing how for-
profit colleges meet the market need for providing education to otherwise underserved
minorities). While Ruch speaks positively of the for-profits' ability to meet the needs of
minority students, he also notes that this occurs not due to social good but from economic
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B. Demographics
The Department of Education (DOE) released a report entitled, Pro-
file of Undergraduate Students: 2007-08 in September of 2010.52 This re-
port catalogs the attributes of students across various institutions of post-
secondary education." While many students who attend for-profit
schools seek knowledge and come to class willing and able to contribute,
many students are unprepared to handle the academic challenge. 4 This
leads to the question: is the drive for volume causing for-profits to enroll
students destined to fail?5 5
opportunity. Id. at 72. Ruch also acknowledges that the emphasis placed on profit often
leads to high-pressure sales tactics. Id. at 96.
52. U.S. Di'iT OF Eouc., NAT'L CTR. Foi Eruc. STATIsTics, PROFILu OF UNDER-
GRADUATE STUDENNTS: 2007-08, 1 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/
2010205.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Compare JoHN SPERLING & RonEir W. TUCKER, FOR-PROFIT HiIGllER EDUCA-
-noN 90 (1997) (describing the profile of the average UOP student as an individual with
meaningful work experience seeking a "better place in tomorrow's work environment."),
with Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, Eouc., LABOR AND PENSIONS,
111-- CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROwTII, SPENDING, STUDENT Dinur
AND UNANSWERED QuiEsTIONS IN FOR-PROFIr HIGHER EDUCATION: HEARING BFioiu
TIIE S. COMM. ON HEALTH, Eruc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 7-8 (Comm. Print 2010), availa-
ble at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf (attempting to decipher
the dropout rates at for-profit colleges which may be upwards of sixty percent).
55. The lack of standards in pre-admissions testing at for-profit colleges is an issue
addressed by the DOE's new regulations. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832,
66,960-66 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R pt. 668). However, this facet of the
regulations is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ARRANGED BY
PROGRAM TYPE5 6
For-Profit For-Profit Public Public Non-Profit
<2yrs. +2yrs. <2yrs. 2 yrs. 4 yrs.
Female57  76.2% 67.1% 62.8% 56.3% 54.2%
Minority (non-white) 58  61.2% 51.1% 43.9% 39.8% 33.1%
Average Age 5 9  26 29 30 28 24
Family Income <$20,00060 52.8% 42% 36% 26.4% 19.6%
Students with Dependents ' 45.1% 50.7% 43.5% 32.2% 14.4%
Students with Nontraditional 20.1% 16.1% 19.2% 10.4% 3.1%
High School Diplomas6 2
Receiving Federal Aid63 83.4% 95.8% 38.5% 27.4% 54.6%
The demographics above are compared across several program types
and illustrate the unbalanced distribution of minorities and underprivi-
leged students attending for-profit and non-profit institutions as well as
two-year, four-year, and certificate programs (less than two years).6 ' The
table above provides a comparison of student demographics, and high-
56. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDuc. S-rATISTICs, PROFILE
OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS: 2007-08 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/
2010205.pdf (reporting statistics on undergraduate students from 2007 through 2008, on
topics such as financial aid status, race, age, and attendance). The chart was created by the
author from information derived from the DOE's Profile of Undergraduate Students:
2007-08. See id. at 56, 58, 60, 64, 77, 81, 89, 93, 109.
57. Id. at 56.
58. See id. at 60. The percentage of White students was subtracted from 100% in
order to determine percentage of non-white students.
59. Id. at 64.
60. See id. at 72. 77, 81. To calculate income, the percentage of students with incomes
under $20,000 was added together from both independent and dependent students. Table
3.5A uses weighted percentages based upon dependency status of individuals enrolled at
various institutions.
61. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PROFILE OF
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS, 2007-08, 89 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/
2010205.pdf (reporting on the percentage of undergraduates, both married and single, who
are responsible for dependents). The number of students with dependents was calculated
by subtracting the percentage of students with no dependents from 100%.
62. Id. at 93. Calculation of all nontraditional diplomas is calculated by subtracting
the students with high school diplomas from 100%.
63. Id. at 109. Federal aid includes Stafford Loans, Perkins Loans, and Pell Grants.
64. Id. at 160-61, 163. Non-profit four-year degree programs include both private and
public schools that confer bachelor's degrees and are classified as 501(c)(3) organizations.
Id. at 160. Public two-year degree programs consist of associate degrees conferred by com-
munity colleges. See id. at 163. Both for-profit categories represent institutions that are
operated for profit: a less-than two-year degree includes career training and certificate
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lights the disparity between for-profit schools and non-profit schools, in-
cluding the fact that for-profits, on average, educate almost twice as many
minorities.65 Yet the most striking figure in the chart is income level:
over half of students in career training programs live near the poverty
level, which is almost twenty percent higher than students enrolled in
public career programs (community colleges).6 6
The majority of low-income students attend less-than two-year degree
programs: these programs provide hands-on training in fields such as ra-
diology, nursing, web design, and electrical repair.67 Many schools offer
these degrees in eighteen months, advertise placement assistance, and
guarantee students that degree completion will earn them a higher sal-
ary."8 The profit model of for-profit schools is successful because of the
marketing efforts geared toward attracting low-income individuals, which
guarantees federal financial aid dollars. 69 For-profit institutions offer an
educational route for those individuals who do not feel comfortable in a
programs while two plus years includes programs for completing both bachelor's and asso-
ciate's degrees. Id.
65. Id. at 60. The increased representation of minorities at for-profits is a positive
step in increasing opportunities for the underrepresented, but this method of education is
not exactly what scholars imagined when contemplating increases in minority students in
higher education. See Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Shifting from Race to Ethnicity in Higher
Education, 9 SCHOLAR 1, 4-6 (2006) (addressing the role of affirmative action in achieving
diversity in traditional institutions of higher education). Mr. Sevanthinathan argues that
the concept of racial diversity in higher education needs to be expanded to include all
minorities. Id. It flows from this argument that socioeconomic minorities should also be
considered when addressing diversity issues in higher education. Whereas minorities are
underrepresented in traditional institutions of higher education, for-profit colleges re-
present the other end of the spectrum, in which minorities are disproportionately
represented.
66. U.S. DEPT OF Eouc., NAT'I, CTrR. FOR Eouc. STATISTICS, PROFI- OF UNIDER-
GRADUATE STUDNrs: 2007-08, 77, 81 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/
2010205.pdf; Annual Update of HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199, 4120 (Jan. 23,
2009) (providing that the 2009 national poverty guideline is $10,830 for an individual,
$14,570 for a family of two, $18,310 for a family of three and $22,050 for a family of four).
67. See U.S. DEP'T OF Enuc., NAT'L CTR. FoR Eouc. STATISTIcS, PROFILE OF UN-
DERGRADUATE STUDENTS: 2007-08, 77, 81 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/
2010205.pdf.
68. See e.g., Your Decision to Enroll at Remington College Just Got Easier, REMING-
TON COLL. (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.remingtoncollege.edulfast-affordable-associates-de-
grees; see also Complaint at 4-5, Bernal v. Burnett, No. 10-cv-01917-PAB, (D. Colo. Aug.
11, 2010), 2010 WL 3940944 (illustrating how one for-profit institution urges its "admis-
sions representatives to provide uniform misrepresentations and make material omissions
as to the costs and fees related to Westwood programs; job placement opportunities and
salary expectations.").
69. See Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALTII, Eouc., LABOR AND) PEN-
SIONS, 111TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTII, SPENDING, STUDENT
DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: HEARING
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traditional academic setting, and although students point to online learn-
ing and flexible classes as a reason for attendance, these attributes are
now available in increasing numbers from traditional, non-profit
schools.7 0
For-profits have honed in on high demand educational areas and capi-
talized on the shortfalls of community colleges. Generally, for-profits ex-
cel over community colleges in three areas: (1) for-profits have higher
levels of staffing, allowing greater resources for financial aid and career
planning; (2) for-profits have more flexibility and ability to change pro-
grams as needed; and (3) for-profits use effective marketing strategies.7 '
In addition to the fact that prospective students are often unaware of less
expensive public programs, a new issue has recently emerged: a lack of
capacity at community colleges.
Community colleges are turning students away due to lack of capacity
resulting from state budget deficits and misappropriation of federal stim-
ulus funds.7 2 Community colleges in New York and California are plac-
ing students on waitlists for highly sought programs such as nursing, and
budget cuts deprive these schools of resources necessary to employ finan-
cial aid officers.7 ' These factors drive students to the conveniently lo-
cated and highly visible for-profit schools, whose advertisements offer
"easy" ways to improve lives. Unfortunately, many of the advertisements
are overstatements and provide students with misleading information.
BiioRE 'iI! S. COMM. ON HEALI-r, Enuc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 1-2 (Comm. Print
2010), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf.
70. Michelle Howard-Vital, The Appeal Of For-Profit Institutions, CHANGE: THE
MAO. oi, HIGHER LEARNING, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 70.
71. Edited Transcript of Frontline: College, Inc. (Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/interviews/mellow.html (interview with Dr.
Gail Mellow, President, LaGuardia Community College). In evaluating the facilities of a
for-profit college, it must be noted that a great deal of space and money is devoted to the
admissions and financial aid offices, while faculty offices may be nonexistent. Michelle
Howard-Vital, The Appeal Of For-Profit Institutions, 38 CHANGE: THnIE MAG. Of HIGHER1I1
LEARNING 68, 70 (Jan./Feb. 2006). This physical set up of for-profits provides insight into
the importance of recruiting and financial aid. Id.
72. See STEPHEN G. KATSINAS & TERRENCE A. Toi-FSON, EDuc. PoIcY CTr. AT
THE UNIV. OF ALA., FUNDING AN!) AccEss ISSUES IN Puni-c HIGIIER EDUcAnoN: A
COMMUNITY COLLEGE PERSPECrlVE 14-17 (2009), available at http://education.ua.edu/wp-
content/uploads/201 0/Ol/Funding-and-Access-Issues-in-Public-Higher-Education-2009-24-
09.pdf.
73. Edited Transcript of Frontline: College, Inc. (Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/interviews/mellow.html (interview with Dr.
Gail Mellow, President, LaGuardia Community College).
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III. MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION
Congress and the Department of Education (DOE) seek to provide a
post-secondary education to more individuals and develop a competitive
workforce.7 4 Although for-profit schools hold an important place in the
educational landscape, the recurring reports of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion in the industry detract from the sector.7 5 In response to prior reports
of fraud in for-profit schools, Congress passed the Higher Education
Amendments of 1986, 1992, and 1998.
During the spring of 2010, the media alerted the general public to the
abuses of for-profit colleges by exposing the practices (used by some for-
profit colleges) of soliciting enrollment at homeless shelters. The story
was built upon by a documentary entitled College, Inc., which chronicled
the business of for-profit post-secondary education and exposed the pred-
atory practices, escalating costs, and skyrocketing loan default rates.77
74. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration Proposes Student Aid
Rules to Protect Borrowers and Taxpayers; Key Elements of Gainful Employment on a
Separate Track (June 16, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/student-aid-rules-protect-borrow-
ers-and-taxpayers.
75. Id. (revealing alleged misrepresentation by for-profit schools and proposing
stronger administrative oversight).
76. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581,
1588-89 (1998) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C § 1002(a)(4-6) (2006)) (explaining eligi-
bility requirements to be an institution of higher learning and potential reasons for loss of
this status); Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448,
459 (1992) (attempting to improve education services to disadvantaged students); Higher
Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-498, 100 Stat. 1268, 1490 (1986) (threatening
civil penalties against education institutions that engage in misrepresentation). These regu-
lations gave the DOE the ability to enforce PPAs between the DOE and eligible institu-
tions as well as increased the eligibility requirements for proprietary institutions of higher
education.
77. Daniel Golden, Homeless High School Dropouts Lured by For-Profit Colleges,
BILOOMBERG.COM (April 29, 2010, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-30/
homeless-dropouts-from-high-school-lured-by-for-profit-colleges-with-cash.htmi (detailing
the temptation of for-profit schools to enlist homeless persons as part of their enrollment
campaigns); Transcript of Frontline: College Inc. (WGBH Educational Foundation televi-
sion broadcast May 4, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/col-
legeinc/etc/script.html (exposing the players behind the for-profit higher education
industry); Steve Eisman, Presentation at the Ira Sohn Conference: Subprime Goes to Col-
lege 2 (May 26, 2010), http://insidehighered.com/content/download/350088/4329742/ver-
sion/1/file/EismanSohnConference.doc (analyzing the high debt load and default rates of
students attending for-profit colleges). In June of 2010, twenty executives from homeless
shelters wrote a letter to DOE Secretary Arne Duncan addressing marketing abuses by
for-profit colleges and encouraging the DOE's regulation initiative. Sharona Coutts, In-
vestment Funds Stir Controversy Over Recruiting by For-Profit Colleges, PROPUBICA.COM
(Jul. 9, 2010, 11:02 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/investment-funds-stir-contro-
versy-over-recruiting-by-for-profit-colleges (revealing the financial interests at stake in the
for-profit education industry). After an investigation by the news organization ProPublica,
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The timing of these stories stirred speculation that the news attention was
either placed to develop favorable public opinion of the forthcoming reg-
ulations, or was itself the impetus for the regulations.
An April 28, 2010 speech by a DOE official, critical of for-profit col-
leges, made it clear that the Obama administration was preparing to once
again take steps to address an insurgence of fraud accusations, rising stu-
dent debt, and disproportionate default rates of for-profit students." The
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, announced on June 16, 2010, identified
thirteen areas of concern in the for-profit higher education industry." A
separate notice filed on July 23, 2010 focused on a fourteenth issue: defin-
ing gainful employment.so The proposed regulations represent a year-
long dialog between the DOE and teams of negotiators representing
stakeholders."'
Shortly following the dissemination of the proposed rules, the U.S.
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP)
began conducting hearings to learn more about the emerging risk posed
by for-profit education.8 2 The first hearing featured a Senate report high-
it was determined that the letter was orchestrated by an individual working for an invest-
ment firm. Id. While there is little doubt that for-profit colleges have marketed their prod-
ucts through homeless shelters and other inappropriate channels, this development
highlights the concern some have about the influence of investment professionals in the
for-profit controversy. Id. Some Congressional leaders question the motives of these indi-
viduals due to short sell positions in the for-profit education sector held by investment
firms vocal in the debate. Id. These firms will benefit financially from declines in stock
prices caused by bad press and increased regulations. Id.
78. John Hechinger et al., Obama Plans New Rules Cutting Aid to For-Profit Colleges,
BLOOMBERG.COM (May 4, 2010, 11:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-04/
obama-eyes-rules-on-apollo-career-education-aid-as-companies-plan-fight.html (recount-
ing frustration at the high debt levels of students enrolled for-profit institutions). The pro-
posed rules would require for-profit schools to demonstrate that their graduates earn
sufficient incomes to pay off their loans. Id.
79. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration Proposes Student Aid
Rules to Protect Borrowers and Taxpayers; Key Elements of Gainful Employment on a
Separate Track (June 16, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/student-aid-rules-protect-borrow-
ers-and-taxpayers.
80. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Proposed Rule Links Federal Student Aid to
Loan Repayment Rates and Debt-to-Earnings Levels for Career College Graduates (July
23, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/proposed-rule-links-federal-student-aid-
loan-repayment-rates-and-debt-earnings. To remain "fully eligible" under the administra-
tion's planned revisions, for-profit schools must maintain certain prescribed ratios of stu-
dents and graduates who can pay down student debt. Id.
81. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration Proposes Student Aid
Rules to Protect Borrowers and Taxpayers; Key Elements of Gainful Employment on a
Separate Track (June 16, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/student-aid-rules-protect-borrow-
ers-and-taxpayers.
82. Between June 24, 2010 and March 10, 2011 the HELP committee conducted four
hearings on the issue of for-profit colleges. Hearings, U.S. COMM. ON HE-Aurii EuucA-
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lighting the disparity in cost, loan amounts, and default rates between for-
profit and non-profit schools.8 ' The second hearing highlighted a Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO) undercover report exposing fraudu-
lent practices of fifteen for-profit colleges.84 These hearings showcased
personal stories of students, former and current employees, and profes-
sionals engaged in investigation and prosecution of for-profit colleges.
The fraud uncovered through these hearings can be roughly broken into
four categories, each addressed by the DOE's new Program Integrity
rules: (1) fraud in marketing practices; (2) fraudulent misrepresentation
in the value of the degree; (3) fraud in financial aid practices; and (4)
violations of bans on enrollment based compensation for admissions
representatives.
A. Marketing
"[A]dvertising makes people who can't afford it, buy things they don't
want, with money they haven't got."8
Marketing and advertising are an integral part of any business, regard-
less of the industry or profit motive. Even top tier institutions of higher
education entice prospective students with glossy brochures and profes-
sionally produced videos. No demand can be made on proprietary col-
TION LABOR & PENSIONS (Apr. 7, 2011), http://help.senate.gov/hearings/?rid=20cl298a-
5186-4859-8488-a6731 cf07a9e.
83. Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALTi, Enuc., LADOR AND PEN-
SIONS, 111-1H CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVEIRVIEW oiF' GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT
DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUEISTIONS IN FOR-PROirr HIGHER EDUcATION: HEARING
BIFORE THE S. COMM. ON HEAI.:I, Enuc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 8-9 (Comm. Print
2010), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf.
84. Undercover Testing Finds Colleges Encouraged Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive
and Questionable Marketing Practices: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health. Educ., La-
bor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 2, 11-13 (Aug. 4, 2010 revised Nov. 30, 2010) (statement of
Gregory D. Kuntz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S.
Gov't Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf. The
GAO report was revised on November 30th, 2010 to correct discrepancies in the wording
between actual tapes and the written report. Tamar Lewin, U.S. Revises Report on Com-
mercial Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A35, available at 2010 WLNR 24364580
(reporting that subsequent revisions to the GAO report weakened but did not materially
alter the findings of the sting operation). This revision heightened the already partisan
environment surrounding the issue of for-profit colleges and the DOE's new regulations.
Id.
85. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration Proposes Student
Aid Rules to Protect Borrowers and Taxpayers; Key Elements of Gainful Employment on
a Separate Track (June 16, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/student-aid-rules-protect-bor-
rowers-and-taxpayers.
86. MR. BLANDINGs BuIos His DREAM HOUSE (RKO Radio Pictures 1948), availa-
ble at http://www.imdb.com/title/ttOO40613/quotes.
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leges to cease advertising, but, as with the marketing of any product,
appropriate guidelines are needed to ensure consumer protection.
The aggressive marketing tactics employed by for-profit schools are
similar regardless of the institution or degree advertised. Advertisements
take an emotional tone; they appeal to an individual's hopes and dreams
of a better life." Campaigns are designed to address a potential student's
identified requirements of "need, speed and ease.""
On average, for-profits spend over thirty percent of their annual budg-
ets on marketing and recruiting." In 2009, DeVry spent over $179 mil-
lion on advertising expenses, which is approximately $3,800 per new
student.90 Every dollar is carefully targeted to reach the desired demo-
graphic.91 Pictures of men in business suits and women in lab coats boast-
ing of their successes are plastered on bus shelters, aired during daytime
television, and posted on job boards at unemployment offices. 9 2 Adver-
tisements are meticulously worded to achieve the maximum impact, elic-
87. See Michelle Howard-Vital, The Appeal Of For-Profit Institutions, 38 CHANGE:
TIHE MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING 68, 70 (2006) (describing the positive perception of for-
profit schools held by some students); Joshua Woods, Opportunity, Ease, Encouragement,
and Shame: A Short Course in Pitching For-Profit Education, 52 CHRON. REv. OF HIGHER
Eouc. 10, 10 (2006) (recounting a personal experiment to ascertain the marketing rigor of
for-profit schools).
88. Michelle Howard-Vital, The Appeal Of For-Profit Institutions, 38 CHANGE: THE
MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING 68, 70 (2006).
89. Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALII, EDUC., LABOR AND PEN-
SIONS, 111TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT
DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROIrr HIGHER EDUCATION: HEARING
BEFORE TIE S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDuc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 5 (Comm. Print 2010),
available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf.
90. DEVRY, INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 81 (2010), available at http://
www.devryinc.com/resources/pdfs/AnnualReport.pdf (stating DeVry's advertising ex-
penses for the fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010). The cost per student was calculated by
dividing the total advertising expense by the total number of new enrollments in 2009
(46,694 students). DEVRY, INc., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 81 (2010), available at http://
www.devryinc.com/resources/pdfs/Annual-Report.pdf; see also DEVRY, INC., 2009 AN-
NUAL REPORT 7 (2009), available at http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/Annu-
alReports/PDFArchive/dv2009.pdf (providing an overview of the enrollment data for
2009).
91. See Michelle Howard-Vital, The Appeal Of For-Profit Institutions, CIIANGE: THE
MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING 68, 70 (2006).
92. Cf Subprime Goes to College: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 2 (Jun. 24, 2010) (testimony of Steven Eisman, Portfolio
Manager, FrontPoint Financial Services Fund), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/me-
dialdoc/Eisman.pdf (stating that advertisements for for-profit colleges can be found in
places like casinos and homeless shelters); Edited Transcript of Frontline: College, Inc.
(Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinclinterviews/
mellow.html (interview with Dr. Gail Mellow, President, LaGuardia Community College).
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iting a direct response from viewers, driving them to contact the school.9'
In addition to traditional media, for-profit institutions aggressively mar-
ket online, utilizing third party lead-generation vendors.9 4 The content of
these lead-generation sites, or educational aggregators, are neither main-
tained nor developed by the schools but are relied on to generate a signif-
icant number of monthly leads.9 5
While there are no regulations prohibiting marketing or advertising of
colleges and universities, prior DOE regulations and statutory language
added to the Higher Education Act contained guidelines for proprietary
schools.9 6 Provisions state that institutions may face fines, suspension, or
termination of their Title IV funding if they engage in substantial misrep-
resentation regarding educational programs, financial charges, or employ-
ment prospects for graduates.97 The Higher Education Amendments of
1986 created civil penalties for institutions engaging in fraudulent misrep-
resentation9 8 but created no federal private right of action, which would
enable students to file suits directly against offending institutions.99
Rather, students wishing to file individual actions concerning fraudulent
misrepresentation are relegated to filing suit under state consumer pro-
tection laws or lodging complaints with the DOE. 00
In 2007, the California Attorney General's Office entered into a stipu-
lated agreement with Corinthian Colleges, Inc. for violations of Califor-
nia state education and consumer laws.' The state contended that
93. See Edited Transcript of Frontline: College, Inc. (Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/interviews/mellow.html (interview with Dr.
Gail Mellow, President, LaGuardia Community College).
94. See Transcript of All Things Considered: For-Profit Schools Retooling Recruitment
Strategy, National Public Radio (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/2010/12/08/
131913216/For-Profit-Schools-Retool-Recruitment (explaining that although most for-
profit schools buy information from third-party generation vendors, many of these leads
are unreliable).
95. See id. (explaining that many for-profit schools are now refocusing their recruit-
ment strategies and beginning to generate their own leads in order to entice students who
are more likely to be successful).
96. See 34 C.F.R §§ 668.71-.74 (2010).
97. See 34 C.F.R §§ 668.72 (nature of educational program), 668.73 (nature of finan-
cial charges), 668.74 (employability of graduates), 668.84 (fine proceedings), 668.85 (sus-
pension proceedings), 668.86 (limitation or termination proceedings) (2010).
98. Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, sec. 407, § 1094, 100
Stat. 1268, 1490 (assessing civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation).
99. See id. at sec. 487 (granting only the Secretary of Education the power to impose
civil fines or violations).
100. Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the For-Profit Education Sector: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 13-14 (2010) (testimony of
Margaret Reiter, former Deputy Att'y Gen., Office of California Attorney General), avail-
able at http://help.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/Reiter.pdf.
101. Id. at 1-2.
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Corinthian violated laws regarding the misrepresentation of employment
opportunities and program costs to students.10 2 Specifics of the com-
plaint included allegations that representatives from the school over-
stated potential salaries by over 200 percent.10 3 Per the terms of the
stipulated agreement, Corinthian Colleges paid over $6.6 million and was
enjoined from continuing any misleading behaviors.1 04 At no time did
Corinthian admit to any wrongdoing.'
The DOE's new Program Integrity rules strengthen existing regulations
that address misrepresentation in advertising and promotional materi-
als.10 6 The new rules also broaden the definition of misrepresentation to
include both direct and indirect statements of an erroneous, false, or mis-
leading nature.'07 This change holds an eligible institution liable not only
to a prospective student hearing an advertisement but also to a prospec-
tive student who did not hear the advertisement directly from the institu-
tion, but instead learned about the false advertisement from a secondary
source.i'0 If enforced as written, this expanded definition of misrepre-
sentation will protect students from misrepresentations provided by third
party vendors such as online lead-generation sites.'o
While the new regulations broaden the scope of misrepresentation and
provide students protection against misrepresentations made by affiliates
and third parties, they do not create an independent cause of action and
still permit the DOE to use its discretion regarding enforcement.110 It is
noteworthy that the key players in the for-profit sector are already taking
steps to align themselves with the spirit of the new regulations."' After
102. Id. at 2 (articulating the difficulty of successfully prosecuting for-profit colleges).
103. See id. at 10-11.
104. Id. at 12. Five-million-eight-hundred-thousand was paid in restitution to students
while five-hundred-thousand was deposited into a state unfair competition fund. Id. Addi-
tionally, Corinthian was required to discontinue the lowest performing nine programs for a
minimum period of eighteen months. Id.
105. Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the For-Profit Education Sector: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (testimony of Mar-
garet Reiter, former Deputy Att'y Gen., Office of California Attorney General), available
at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reiter.pdf.
106. See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,958 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R § 668.71).
107. Id. at 66,958-59.
108. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,806, 34,834-35 (Jun. 18, 2010).
109. See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,916 (Oct. 29, 2010) (discuss-
ing comments submitted on proposed regulations and changes being made to §§ 669.71(b),
(c)).
110. Id. at 66,915.
111. Transcript of All Things Considered: For-Profit Schools Retooling Recruitment
Strategy, National Public Radio (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/2010/12/08/
131913216/For-Profit-Schools-Retool-Recruitment.
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publication of the final Program Integrity rules, the UOP purchased an
online lead-generation company, hoping to have more control over the
content of the site and ultimately generate higher quality leads.' 1 2
Students of for-profit colleges are also protected by FTC regulations,
which set forth guidelines for consumers.' 3 These regulations detail
what constitutes deceptive advertising, promotional, marketing, and sales
practices for private vocational schools.1 14 The DOE considered the FTC
regulations when crafting the Program Integrity rules and used them as
the basis for the definition of substantial misrepresentation: "any misrep-
resentation on which the person to whom it was made could reasonably
be expected to rely, or has reasonably relied, to that person's detri-
ment.""1 s This misrepresentation definition specifically applies to the na-
ture of the educational program, financial charges, and employability
upon graduation. 1
B. Valuation of the Degree
Misrepresentation concerning the value of a degree can manifest in
three distinct ways. The first is a school's false representation of accredi-
tation status or a potential graduate's ability to qualify for a professional
license."' The second is misrepresenting the ability to transfer credits, 1 8
and the third is an institution's overstatement of employment opportuni-
ties after graduation. 9 Prior DOE regulations provided minimal rules
regarding false, misleading, or erroneous representations made to stu-
dents regarding these matters.120 The new regulations enhance these
prohibitions, using more specific language.12 1
The language of the final Program Integrity rules requires schools to
make various disclosures regarding accreditation when asked.12 2 The
112. See id. (illustrating the ultimate motive is not compliance, but increased profit
through better leads).
113. Guides for Private Vocational and Distance Education Schools, 16 C.F.R § 254
(2010).
114. Id.
115. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R § 668.71(c)).
116. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R H§ 668.72, 668.73, 668.74).
117. Nature of Educational Program, 34 C.F.R §§ 668.72(a), (c)( 2 ) (2010).
118. Id. § 668.72(b).
119. Employability of Graduates, 34 C.F.R § 668.74 (2010).
120. See Nature of Educational Program, 34 C.F.R § 668.72 (2010); Employability of
Graduates, 34 C.F.R § 668.74 (2010).
121. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R § 668.72).
122. See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,806, 34,835 (Jun. 18, 2010).
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rules expand the current provision covering disclosure of examination re-
quirements for receiving a local, state, or federal license; mandates disclo-
sure of whether the course work completed at the school qualifies a
student to meet employment requirements,12 3 and clarifies conditions
under which credits from another institution will be accepted.12 4 The
DOE identified these areas as requiring the utmost transparency from
for-profit colleges to ensure students are truly aware of the value of the
program in which they are enrolling.'
There are numerous examples of students who have enrolled at a for-
profit college only to find upon completion that they were responsible for
varying amounts of student loan debt and held a degree that provided no
credentials.126 For example, Sherry Hafferkamp wanted her master's de-
gree in psychology.127 Persuaded by an Argosy University admissions
counselor's enticement of earning a doctorate, and pressured to make her
decision quickly because only two spaces remained, she enrolled in the
doctorate program at Argosy University in North Dallas, Texas. 1 2 8 At
the time of enrollment, Ms. Hafferkamp was assured that the degree from
Argosy would be accredited by the American Psychological Association
(APA), but Argosy never received the accreditation it expected to receive
from the APA.129 Because the program was not accredited, her com-
pleted degree does not allow her to legally practice as a psychologist in
Maryland, where she now lives.' 3 o Ms. Hafferkamp is currently trying to
make ends meet while paying down over $100,000 in federal student
loans.131
Equally distressing is the story of Yasmine Issa. Ms. Issa, a single
mother, testified directly before the HELP committee. 3 2 Upon success-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 34,834.
126. See, e.g., Complaint at 39, Montgomery v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 10CH50281
(Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 23, 2010), 2010 WL 4815908 (a class action complaint alleging that
defendant for-profit educational institutions engaged in fraudulent and deceptive practices
in an effort to sell an education with little, if any, value); Transcript of Frontline: College
Inc. (WGBH Educational Foundation television broadcast May 4, 2010), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/etc/script.html.
127. Transcript of Frontline: College Inc. (WGBH Educational Foundation television
broadcast May 4, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/
etc/script.htmi.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong.
1 (June 24, 2010) (testimony of Yasmine Issa), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/me-
dia/doc/lssa.pdf.
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fully completing an ultrasound sonographer program at the Sanford-
Brown Institute, she learned that the degree did not provide her the nec-
essary credentials to sit for the state certification exam.1 33 In addition,
Ms. Issa discovered that Sanford-Brown's program was not accredited
with the American Registry for Diagnostic Medical Sonographers, and
that fact made her unemployable as a sonographer.134 Ms. Issa is a victim
of circular logic: no one will hire her without certification, and she cannot
get certified without full-time work in the field or an accredited degree. 1 35
Two years post-graduation, Ms. Issa has yet to work in her chosen field
and owes over $21,000 for a program that provided no benefit.' 3 6 After
DOE officials reviewed public comments on the proposed regulation spe-
cifically mentioning Ms. Issa's predicament, the DOE changed the pro-
posed rules.' 37 In order to call direct attention to this issue of licensing,
the final version of the proposed rule states that a failure to disclose spe-
cialized accreditation requirements is a form of misrepresentation. 3 8
The second misrepresentation concerning the value of a degree is the
ability for a student to transfer credits from or to a for-profit institu-
tion.139 This is a worry for students and often an area where schools do
not provide accurate or complete information.' 4 0 Prior regulations pro-
vided only that schools needed to refrain from misleading students re-
garding transferability of credits from their own institution.14' New
Program Integrity rules are expanded to include statements made con-
cerning accepting transfer credits from other schools, as well as clarifying
disclosure requirements.14 2 Complaints arising out of transferability of
credits usually occur once a student learns the degree he or she received
will not allow the student to qualify for licensing, employment, or addi-
133. Id. at 1-2. In order for Ms. Issa to take the sonographer licensing exam, she was
required to either have one year of work experience or a bachelor's degree. Id.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. Shortly after graduating from Sanford-Brown, Ms. Issa learned that a local
community college offered an accredited degree for sonographers for half the price. Id.
136. Id.
137. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,919 (Oct. 29, 2010) (addressing
remarks provided during the comment period pertaining to proposed § 668.72).
138. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (proposed Oct. 29, 2010)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R § 668.72(n)).
139. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (proposed Oct. 29, 2010)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.72(b)).
140. Complaint at 2, Miller v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No 100918220 (Utah D.C. filed
Sept. 24, 2010), 2010 WL 4818792; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor
and Pensions, 111th Cong. 1 (June 24, 2010) (testimony of Yasmine Issa), available at http://
help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Issa.pdf.
141. Nature of Educational Program, 34 C.F.R. § 668.72(b) (2010).
142. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. § 668.72(b)(2)).
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tional degrees. 14 3 In these cases students are not only unqualified for the
career they trained for, but also cannot transfer the credits completed to a
school that will qualify them. An illustration of this predicament is
Michelle Zuver.'" Ms. Zuver completed a bachelor's degree in criminal
justice only to discover that no law enforcement agency she applied to
would recognize her degree. 14 5 Now, $86,000 in debt, she is willing to
attend an accredited program in order to qualify for a job in her chosen
field but not a single credit from the for-profit school will transfer.14 6
The third misrepresentation applies to statements made to graduates
regarding employability.147 The new regulations prohibit schools from
speaking to students about employment without explicit knowledge of
current or future conditions, salaries, or employment opportunities.14 8
Likewise, for-profit colleges are now curbed from misrepresenting em-
143. Complaint at 21-22, Miller v. Corinthian Colls, Inc., No 100918220 (Utah D.C.
filed Sept. 24, 2010), 2010 WL 4818792; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 9 (Sept. 30, 2010) (testimony of Lauren Asher, President,
Institute for College Access & Success), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Asher.pdf.
144. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong.
9 (Sept. 30, 2010) (testimony of Lauren Asher, President, Institute for College Access &
Success), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Asher.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Id. While the federal regulations provide no individual cause of action, the Cali-
fornia legislature did attempt to give students harmed by misrepresentation regarding
transferability statutory protection that would have allowed for a suit to be filed. Daghlian
v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1237-38 (C.D. Ca. 2007). Although the Califor-
nia provisions provided protection to students by requiring transfer policies to be in writ-
ing, the California legislature chose to apply the regulations only to schools not accredited
by the local accrediting body. Id. at 1237-38. This choice led to the judicial determination
that the state law violated the commerce clause by restricting interstate commerce. Id. at
1241-42. Similarly, in a lawsuit filed by the UOP, it was alleged that Florida's statute
allowing only Florida corporations to apply for the required accreditation violated the
commerce clause. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, The Univ. of Phoenix v.
Bradley, No. 4:08-cv-00217-RH-WCS (N.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2008), 2008 WL 8045858. These
two cases highlight the complex issue of accreditation concerning for-profit schools and the
problems that arise because there is no single accrediting body but rather a web of regional
accrediting bodies. The creation of a single accrediting body is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but identifies a potential solution to inequality in program performance and
would allow credits to transfer more freely across institutions.
147. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959-60 (proposed Oct. 29,
2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.74); see also Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg.
66,832, 66,919 (Oct. 29, 2010) (discussing the testimony of Yasmine Issa and the DOE's
response).
148. See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (proposed Oct. 29,
2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.74(c)) (specifically addressing representations
made by the institution regarding knowledge of employment opportunities and compensa-
tion rates).
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ployability through advertisements that lead perspective students to think
the school will train them for a specific job.14 9 Phrases such as "[m]en/
women wanted to train for," "[h]elp [w]anted," or "[b]usiness
[o]pportunities" will now face scrutiny by the DOE.15 o In order to offer
further protection from misrepresentation, the new regulations leave in-
tact prior provisions prohibiting false statements regarding: job place-
ment services, publication of government statistics, and a school's
relationships to placement agencies.' 5 ' In addition, the program partici-
pation agreement (PPA) provides that any job placement rates used in
advertising must be made available to potential students so students may
substantiate the truthfulness of the claims. 1 52 This is yet another way the
DOE hopes to encourage transparency.
Promulgation of strict misrepresentation guidelines are not the only
way the DOE seeks to end the usage of misleading statements to stu-
dents. As part of the new rules, the DOE developed mandatory report-
ing and disclosure guidelines for all for-profit schools.'5 3  The new
disclosure and reporting guidelines attempt to standardize the means by
which schools report graduation rates, placement rates, program costs,
average student debt, and occupation profiles.15 4 A standardized ap-
proach to disclosure will allow students to compare costs and programs
across various schools, giving them the information necessary to make
informed choices. As an initial step, the new rules set to take effect in
149. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (proposed Oct. 29, 2010)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.74(d)).
150. Id.
151. Employability of Graduates, 34 C.F.R. § 668.74 (2010).
152. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(8) (2006). This provision was part of the Higher Education
Amendments of 1986 that set out the initial requirements of PPAs. Higher Education
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, sec. 407, § 1094(a), 100 Stat. 1268, 1488. This
condition also includes language stating that state-licensing requirements for an occupation
must be provided to students. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(8) (2006).
153. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66948 (proposed Oct. 29, 2010) (to
be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.6); see also Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832,
66,835 (Oct. 29, 2010). Comments provided on the new disclosure requirements ques-
tioned the fact that this new provision applies only to for-profit schools. Id. at 66,835. The
DOE's discussion clarifies that the disclosure requirement applies to all schools offering
programs for gainful employment, therefore all schools that qualify for Title IV funding
under §§ 102(b)-(c), 101(b)(1) of the Higher Education Act. Id. These sections define
schools eligible for Title IV funds, which includes proprietary schools. 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1001(b), 1002(a)(1)(A), 1002(b) (2006). For more information, refer to Part II of this
Comment.
154. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,948-49 (proposed Oct. 29,
2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R § 668.6). Occupation profiles must be a link to O*Net, a
website established by the Department of Labor, which provides detailed information re-
garding particular jobs, the training required, and the expected salaries. Id. at 66,949;
O*NE- ONLINE, http://online.onetcenter.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
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July 2011, directs schools to prominently place the information on their
websites and on printed materials.' Although there currently is no stan-
dardized format for disclosures, the DOE intends to create a mandatory
disclosure form.1 56 This future step will ensure that all information is dis-
seminated in the same manner and in the same format and will make it
easier for prospective students to make comparisons.' 57
The stories of Sherry Hafferkamp, Yasmine Issa, and Michelle Zuver
provide a glimpse into the resulting consequences of misrepresentation.
They showcase fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by for-profit in-
stitutions against students regarding the value of the degree. These ex-
amples only represent a small portion of fraudulent behaviors exhibited
by proprietary schools. Students are not only misled about program ac-
creditation and ability to qualify for employment in a chosen field, but
are also consistently misled regarding program costs and the conse-
quences of accepting federal aid.
C. Financial Matters
Misrepresentation of financial issues includes: fraudulent misrepresen-
tation regarding program costs, financial aid disclosures to students, and
actions taken to defraud the federal government."5 s The DOE seeks to
control fraudulent misrepresentation by including statements concerning
financial aid and program costs under new misrepresentation regula-
tions.'59 The DOE believes requiring schools to accurately convey infor-
mation regarding program costs and the consequences of financial aid
155. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,948-49 (proposed Oct. 29,
2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.6).
156. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,833, 66,836 (Oct. 29, 2010). The
DOE stipulates that until such time a form is developed, schools must comply with the
regulations as they are written. Id. at 66,836. In addition, schools are given leeway in how
they choose to report placement rates, but must inform the DOE how they intend to make
the calculation. Id. at 66,838. This approach takes into consideration the concerns made
during the comment period and will allow schools to utilize an approach already approved
by states or accrediting bodies. Id.
157. See id. at 66,835-36 (pointing to the DOE's consideration of the comments on
how the disclosures could be made most helpful to students in the implementation of pro-
spective policies).
158. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. § 668.73).
159. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (proposed Oct. 29, 2010)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.73); Nature of Financial Charges, 34 C.F.R. § 668.73
(2010) (listing only two areas of financial assistance protected from misrepresentation).
Prior Program Integrity regulations only regulated misrepresentations regarding financial
charges as they pertained to scholarships and characterizations regarding whether specific
charges were customary. Nature of Financial Charges, 34 C.F.R. § 668.73(a)-(b) (2010).
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will give students vital information needed to make decisions regarding
their financial commitments.' 6 0
The Program Integrity rules subject several financial issues to the mis-
representation clause, including but not limited to: program costs, institu-
tions' refund policies, and availability or nature of financial assistance.161
The rule also covers misrepresentation regarding a student's loan repay-
ment responsibilities, regardless of program completion or employment,
and a student's ability to accept or reject any funds offered by the school
in the form of federal loans.'
A GAO undercover investigation provided first-hand evidence of
fraudulent behavior regarding financial aid.'6 In the evaluation of fif-
teen proprietary schools, GAO investigators experienced misrepresenta-
tions regarding program costs as well as acts resulting in fraudulent
submission of financial aid applications.16 4 Investigators documented
that representatives from nine of the fifteen schools provided deceptive
statements regarding program costs.' 6 1 One school quoted the investiga-
tor a yearly cost of $12,000 for a two year program, but when the investi-
gator asked about the total program cost, school officials revealed the
total cost was $30,000.166 This is evidence of the school's desire to mis-
lead the student. 167 The GAO investigators also noted that seventy per-
cent of the schools either declined to provide applicants access to
160. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,806, 34,849 (June 18, 2010).
161. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (proposed Oct. 29, 2010)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.73).
162. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,959 (proposed Oct. 29, 2010)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.73(d), (e)).
163. For-Profit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds Colleges Encouraged Fraud and
Engaged in Deceptive and Questionable Marketing Practices: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 7-9 (2010), (statement of Gregory D.
Kuntz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S. Government
Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0948t.pdf. In re-
sponse to the government expos6, Everest College, owned and operated by Corinthian
Colleges, has begun to secretly shop its own campuses with the intention of using this
footage to catch and fire employees violating policies. Richard Danielson, State Opens
Civil Inquiry into 5 For-Profit Colleges, Sr. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at 9B, avail-
able at 2010 WLNR 21060061.
164. For-Profit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds Colleges Encouraged Fraud and
Engaged in Deceptive and Questionable Marketing Practices: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of Gregory D.
Kuntz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S. Government
Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf.
165. Id. at 11.
166. Id.
167. See id. (pointing out the deliberate nature of the misleading information pro-
vided by the college representatives).
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financial aid availability or directly misled students regarding the respon-
sibilities inherent to government loans.1 68
On several occasions, school representatives misrepresented to the
GAO investigator the student's responsibility for repaying financial aid
and assisted students in committing fraud. 1 6 9  Applicants were en-
couraged to lie on their Free Application for Federal Student Aid
(FAFSA) by increasing dependents or omitting assets.170 In one instance,
a student was told that the financial aid representative would erase the
$250,000 he claimed as savings so he could qualify for federal loans."'
Another undercover student was advised that she could request the maxi-
mum amount of loans, regardless of need, and place any remaining mon-
ies in a high yield savings account.' 7 2
In addition to these fraudulent actions, there are many reports of for-
profit institutions denying refunds, failing to report student withdrawals,
or generally delaying a student's withdrawal until they are ineligible to
receive a refund. 7 3 By engaging in these fraudulent practices, proprie-
tary institutions ensure that the school maintains the federal funding al-
though the student received no benefit.' 7 4 Regardless of their lack of
168. Id. (cataloging abuses regarding financial aid practices by investigated institu-
tions). Six schools refused to discuss financial aid with the undercover investigators until
they completed enrollment forms, requiring that they not only complete application forms,
but also pay an application fee. Id.
169. For-Profit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds Colleges Encouraged Fraud and
Engaged in Deceptive and Questionable Marketing Practices: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 7-8 (2010) (statement of Gregory D.
Kuntz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, United States Gov-
ernment Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id. at 12.
173. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th
Cong. 7-8 (June 24, 2010) (testimony of Kathleen S. Tighe, Inspector General, U.S. De-
partment of Education), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tighe.pdf; see
also Hearing on Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the For-Profit Education Sector Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 11-12 (June 24, 2010) (state-
ment of Margaret Reiter, former Deputy Attorney General, Office of California Attorney
General), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reiter.pdf; Complaint at 2-3,
Taubenfeld v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 03C 8884 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2003), 2003 WL
23800572 (alleging falsification of student records including billing students for classes
never attended).
174. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th
Cong. 7-8 (June 24, 2010) (testimony of Kathleen S. Tighe, Inspector General, U.S. De-
partment of Education), available at http://help.senate.gov/imolmedialdoclTighe.pdf; Sub-
prime Goes to College: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and
Pensions, 111th Cong. 4 (Jun. 24, 2010) (testimony of Steven Eisman, Portfolio Manager,
FrontPoint Financial Services), available at http://help.senate.gov/imolmedialdoc/Eis-
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benefit, students are responsible for this debt that is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.' Furthermore, schools manipulating withdrawal dates and
falsifying records are in violation of eligibility requirements of the Higher
Education Act.17 6
IV. INCENTIVE COMPENSATION BANS
"Greed captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit."' 7 7
As discussed above, proprietary schools function as corporations-fo-
cusing on maximizing profit."1 7  Schools realize income from federal aid
programs after fourteen days from the start of the term, so they are incen-
tivized to enroll students and ensure they stay enrolled for two weeks so
they are not compelled to return the federal aid. 9 To maximize profits,
for-profit schools focus on student growth-this places substantial impor-
tance on efforts of recruiters and admissions personnel.1 so As the market
for proprietary institutions grows more crowded with competitors,
schools resort to using whatever methods are available to get students
enrolled.18 '
man.pdf; see also Hearing on Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the For-Profit Education Sector
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 13 (June 24, 2010)
(testimony of Margaret Reiter, former Deputy Attorney General, Office of California At-
torney General), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reiter.pdf.
175. Hearing on Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the For-Profit Education Sector Before the
S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 13 (June 24, 2010) (testi-
mony of Margaret Reiter, former Deputy Attorney General, Office of California Attorney
General), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reiter.pdf. Defaulting on a
student loan attaches to an individual's credit report making him or her ineligible for fu-
ture student loans and limiting his or her ability to qualify to borrow money for a home or
a car. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 43,622 (July 26, 2010).
176. Institutional Refunds, 20 U.S.C. § 1091b(b)(1) (2006) (detailing the responsibility
of an institution for the return of Title IV funds).
177. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1987).
178. See RICHARD S. RucH, HIGHER ED, INC. 92 (2001) (arguing that proprietary
institutions' profit models are beneficial due to disclosure requirements).
179. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th
Cong. 2 (Aug. 4, 2010) (statement of Joshua Pruyn, former Admissions Rep., Alta Col-
lege), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/Pruyn.pdf. The DOE strengthened
the requirements concerning return of Title IV funding due to withdrawal as part of the
new regulations, clarifying what constitutes a withdrawal. Program Integrity Issues, 75
Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,951-52 (proposed Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.22).
A full discussion of this topic is outside the scope of this Comment.
180. See Joshua Woods, Opportunity, Ease, Encouragement, and Shame: A Short
Course in Pitching For-Profit Education, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., THE CHRON. REV.,
Jan. 13, 2006, at 10, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Opportunity-Ease/13800.
181. See also Subprime Goes to College: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 5 (Jun. 24, 2010) (statement of Steven Eisman,
Portfolio Manager, FrontPoint Financial Services), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/
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In 1992, Congress responded to reports of high-pressure tactics used in
recruiting at for-profit schools by legislating a ban on enrollment-based
compensation (incentive compensation bans).s 2 Regulations passed by
the DOE in 2002 weakened the impact of the ban by creating twelve safe
harbor provisions." The safe harbors exempted activities traditionally
considered incentive pay.'8 This made it difficult for institutions to take
the legislative changes seriously and caused confusion about what consti-
tuted a violation of the compensation ban."' Examples of the safe
harbors include: exempting incentive pay for enrollment of non-Title IV
students; providing compensation for signing institutional contracts; in-
centives based on student completion of one year of a program; incentive
pay for clerical "pre-enrollment" activities; token gifts under $100; incen-
tives for internet enrollments; and payments to third parties.' 8 6 The final
Program Integrity rules remove the safe harbors, thus meeting the origi-
nal goals of Congress.' 8 7
The removal of the safe harbor provisions eliminates the government-
sanctioned road map for evading the incentive compensation ban and sig-
nals to for-profit colleges that compensation based on quantitative vari-
ables will not be tolerated. The DOE intends to utilize a two-part test to
determine if a school's compensation plan violates the regulation. 88 The
first part questions whether a payment is made for services rendered, i.e.,
an incentive payment, and the second question asks if that payment is
based directly or indirectly on actions taken to enroll a student or secure
a financial aid award.' 89 Payments will be considered in violation of the
incentive compensation ban if the answer to both questions is yes. 190 An-
other safeguard added to the incentive compensation ban is the presump-
media/doc/Eisman.pdf (suggesting that for-profit colleges are completely incentivized by
volume rather than quality, and explaining why for-profit colleges account for such low
satisfaction rates).
182. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, sec. 490, § 487(a),
106 Stat. 448, 625 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20) (2006)).
183. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(ii)(A)-(L) (2009).
184. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,806, 34,816 (proposed Jun. 18, 2010).
185. See id. at 34,816-17 (proposing statutory revision to assuage confusion by provid-
ing a clear prohibition against "any commission, bonus, or other incentive payment based
directly or indirectly on success in securing enrollments or financial aid to any person or
entity engaged in any student recruiting or admission activities or in making decisions re-
garding the award of student financial assistance").
186. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(ii)(B)-(C), (E)-(F), (H), (J)-(L) (2009).
187. See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,950 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)) (amending the PPA by making revisions in accor-
dance with original mandate "regarding the award of title IV, HEA program funds").
188. Id. at 66,876.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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tion that multiple salary increases within one year are based purely on
enrollment performance, and therefore will be considered in violation of
the regulation.' 9 '
Previously, schools crafted compensation to fit within the safe harbors
but worked the system in a way that allowed them to incentivize enroll-
ment, thus placing numbers above the best interest of the students.' 9 2
The misrepresentations discussed above directly flow from the compensa-
tion structure of admissions representatives.19 3 With pressure on admis-
sions representatives to achieve enrollments, students are met with high-
pressure sales tactics and often do not obtain the guidance necessary to
allow them to make informed decisions.19 4
Increased complaints to the DOE and a rise in litigation are two of the
consequences of the safe harbors. Litigation, in the form of Qui Tam'95
suits, are commenced under the False Claims Act.' 9 6  These
whistleblower lawsuits allege violations of the compensation ban by for-
mer employees of for-profit colleges, and raised the legal question re-
garding the significance of PPAs.197 PPAs are "mandatory agreement[s]
between the school and the DOE which 'shall condition the initial and
continuing eligibility of the school to participate in a program upon com-
pliance with' specific statutory requirements."' 98
191. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,950 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(i)(B)).
192. See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,806, 34,817 (proposed Jun. 18,
2010) (describing institutional manipulation of the first safe harbor provision which prohib-
its incentive payment based solely upon securing enrollment); United States ex rel. Main v.
Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that by basing compensation
on enrollments, recruiters are encouraged to enroll students who are not qualified academ-
ically or financially).
193. See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,806, 34,817 (proposed Jun. 18,
2010) (noting that "[w]hen admissions personnel are compensated substantially, if not en-
tirely, upon the numbers of students enrolled, the incentive to deceive or misrepresent the
manner in which a particular educational program meets a student's need increases
substantially").
194. See id.
195. BLACK'S LAw DicIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2009) (defining Qui Tam as "[a]n action
brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the
government or some specified public institution will receive").
196. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006) (providing a cause of action against any
individual who knowingly makes a false statement or claim in an attempt to secure
payment).
197. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Serv., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d
487, 490 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (examining ITT's "incentive salary structure" offered to admis-
sions and recruitment employees), aff'd per curiam, 111 Fed. App'x 296 (5th Cir. 2004).
198. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a) (2006).
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Circuit courts are split as to whether employees of for-profit colleges
have standing to bring suits under the False Claims Act.' 99 This contro-
versy stems from the characterization of the disclosures made by schools
in their PPAs.200 In order for a fraudulent misrepresentation action to
stand under the False Claims Act, the misrepresentation has to be a false
record or material statement made to the government in order to secure
funds.20 1 Schools claim that the statements contained in PPAs are not
"certifications of compliance with either the incentive ban or accredita-
tion requirements. "202 Instead, they assert that executing a PPA with the
DOE is merely a requirement for participation in the award of Title IV
funds.20 3 In essence, they argue there is no stipulation within the PPA
providing that payment is contingent on compliance with the
regulations.2 04
In United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educational Services, Inc.,205 the
Fifth Circuit upheld the use of a two-part test to determine availability of
a claim under the False Claims Act.20 6 The test required that the school
"knowingly [makes a] false certification of compliance with a statute or
regulation and that certification is a prerequisite to payment." 207 The
court held that a PPA does not require a participating school to certify
that they are in compliance with the incentive ban in order to receive
Title IV funds; therefore, the false statements in the PPA are not viola-
tions of the False Claims Act.2 0 8 Based on this analysis, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a complaint by former employees
199. United States ex rel. Powell v. Am. Intercont'l Univ., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2277-
RWS, 2010 WL 2245574, at *2-3 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 2010) (discussing the circuit split be-
tween the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit); United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland
City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005); United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of
Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
200. Powell, 2010 WL 2245574, at *2.
201. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)( 2) (2006).
202. Powell, 2010 WL 2245574, at *2; see Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 500, 502.
203. Powell, 2010 WL 2245574, at *2; see Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (finding the
requirements of the PPA are only a condition of participation eligibility, rather than a
certification of certain facts to the DOE).
204. Powell, 2010 WL 2245574, at *2; see Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at, 502.
205. 284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 502 (S.D. Tex. 2003), aff'd per curiam, 111 Fed. App'x 296
(5th Cir. 2004).
206. See Graves, 111 Fed. App'x at 297 (per curiam) (affirming the lower court's deci-
sion on the grounds stated in the memorandum opinion); Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 498
(defining the necessary elements for a False Claims Act claim).
207. Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (reviewing the general terms and conditions sec-
tion of the PPA to determine if compliance with the compensation ban requires
certification).
208. Id. at 500-01.
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of ITT.2 0 9 The employees alleged that ITT's policies violated the com-
pensation ban by establishing salaries based on five to ten percent of
earned revenues. 2 1 0 Additionally, the court ruled that there was no fraud
in the actual request for payment made under Title IV.2 11
After the Fifth Circuit's ruling, the Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and
the Northern District of Georgia held that former employees may claim a
cause of action under the False Claims Act based on misrepresentations
made in PPAs.2 12 These courts established the theory of promissory
fraud as a cause of action under the False Claims Act and stated that it is
irrelevant that the fraud occurred prior to the actual request for loans.21 3
The Ninth Circuit, in United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoe-
214 ta orfcosaet tt
nix, stated that four factors are required to state a claim under the
theory of promissory fraud. 2 15 These factors are: (1) a false statement
was made; (2) the fraud was perpetrated with knowledge; (3) the fraud
was material; and (4) the statement caused the government to disburse
monies.2 1 6 While schools argue that the incentive ban is not material be-
cause the PPA is "a condition of participation, not a condition of pay-
ment," the court interpreted the PPA as a prerequisite to federal
funding.217 The court held that any violation of the PPA disqualifies the
school from receiving Title IV funds. 218 Under this theory, because the
school received funding under fraudulent circumstances, the school was
liable under the False Claims Act.2 19 The court also dismissed the notion
209. Graves, 111 Fed. App'x at 297 (per curiam).
210. Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (defining "earned revenue" as monies earned by
continuing students and new enrollments). ITT's "incentive salary structure" offered em-
ployees "5% of earned revenues for Inside Representatives and 10% of earned revenues
for Outside Representatives." Id.
211. Id. at 496, 504.
212. United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1177-78 (9th
Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that an institution which knowingly commits
fraud in the PPA can be held liable under the False Claims Act); United States ex rel. Main
v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (determining that because a failure
to comply with PPAs would prohibit schools from receiving government funds, any fraud
contained within the PPA makes the school amenable to claims under the False Claims
Act); United States ex rel. Powell v. Am. InterCont'l Univ., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2277-RWS,
2010 WL 2245574, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 2010) (furthering the reasoning of the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits in upholding a cause of action for fraudulently submitting a PPA).
213. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174; Main, 426 F.3d at 916; Powell, 2010 WL 2245574, at
*2.
214. 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006).
215. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1176 (emphasis in original).
218. See id.
219. See id.
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that the term "certification," used by the Fifth Circuit, is implicit to
materiality.2 20
The facts of Hendow22' exhibit the particularly troubling nature of the
blatant violations of the ban on incentive compensation. In 2004, Mary
Hendow and Julie Albertson, former employees of UOP, filed suit
against the school alleging that UOP continually submitted PPAs that at-
tested to its compliance with the incentive compensation ban while know-
ingly violating the ban.222  They charged that UOP encouraged
representatives "to enroll students without reviewing their transcripts";
ranked employees based on enrollment numbers; and offered higher sala-
ries, benefits, incentives, and gifts to employees who met targets.2 23 in
addition, they claimed UOP's common practice consisted of keeping two
sets of employee records: one showing the true compensation structure
based on enrollments, and a second set containing employee reviews fo-
cusing on approved qualitative factors used for the DOE.2 24
After six years of litigation, UOP and the Plaintiffs submitted to a joint
stipulation agreement.22 5 In this agreement, UOP paid the U.S. Govern-
ment $67.5 million.2 26 From this amount the government paid Hendow
and Albertson nineteen-million dollars.22 7 UOP accepted no liability for
220. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1172-73.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1169.
223. Id. (illustrating the role incentives play in recruitment by conveying how Albert-
son's salary was increased $50,000 after achieving her target). The court documents al-
leged that UOP tied compensation to enrollments as well as providing trips and electronics
for high performers. Id.
224. Id.
225. Supplemental Joint Stipulation of Dismissal and [Proposed] Order at 1-2, United
States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, No. 203-CV-00457, (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2009),
2009 WL 5431573.
226. Settlement Agreement at 3, United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix,
No 203-cv-00 457 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2009), 2009 WL 6528368. This was not the first time
UOP paid the DOE for violations of the incentive compensation ban. In 2004, UOP paid
the DOE $9.8 million to settle claims in response to a Program Review Report that identi-
fied several violations of the incentive compensation ban. Joshua Woods, Opportunity,
Ease, Encouragement, and Shame: A Short Course in Pitching For-Profit Education,
CI IRON, OF HIGHER EDuc., TiIm CIIRON. REV., Jan. 13, 2006, at 10; see also U.S. DEPT. OF
EDuc., PROGRAM REVIEw REPORT, PRCN 200340922254, UNIv. Of- PIOENIx 7-27 (2003),
available at http://www.kroplaw.com/uop/DOE.report.on.UOP.pdf. The 2003 DOE report
details UOP's pay stacking structure, aggressive sales training techniques, prizes and other
awards based on enrollment, and the cover-up that occurred during the investigation. U.S.
DIP'T. oF Eouc., PROGRAM REVIEw REPORT, PRCN 200340922254, UNIV. o PHOENIX
7-27 (2003), available at http://www.kroplaw.com/uop/DOE.report.on.UOP.pdf.
227. Settlement Agreement at 3, United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix,
No 203-CV-00457 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2009), 2009 WL 6528368.
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the accusations and made no concessions to alter policies.2 2 8 Addition-
ally, as a condition of the agreement, the DOE was barred from taking
further action to investigate or sanction UOP for the alleged
behaviors.2 29
Recently, graphic examples of incentive ban violations perpetrated by
for-profits have come to the public's attention.2 3 0 Former admissions
representatives from both Education Management Corporation and Alta
Colleges testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Health, Education
Labor and Pensions describing the financial incentives tied to enroll-
ment.2 31 Josh Pryun, former Admissions Representative at Alta Col-
lege's Westwood College, exposed company emails detailing the
incentives used to push enrollments.23 2 Westwood routinely incentivized
its agents by creating competitions amongst groups, offering baseball
tickets or dinners to individuals who met enrollment goals, or threatening
humiliation to those who did not.2 33 Pryun describes a high paced sales
environment where the pressure was on to enroll students regardless of
qualifications. 23 4 The description of the enrollment process provided by
employees is the embodiment of the concern highlighted by Judge Eas-
terbrook in the United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City University rul-
ing: that incentive compensation will lead to enrollment of "poorly
qualified students who . .. derive little benefit from the subsidy and may
be . . . unwilling to repay federally guaranteed loans."23 5
228. Id. at 2.
229. Id. at 4.
230. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong.
3 (2010) (testimony of Joshua Pruyn, former Admissions Rep., Alta College), available at
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pruyn.pdf; Class Action Complaint at 16-22, Bernal
v. Burnett, No. 10-CV-01917 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 11, 2010), 2010 WL 3940944.
231. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong.
2-3 (2010) (testimony of Kathleen A. Bittel, employee, Education Management Corpora-
tion), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Bittel.pdf; Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of Joshua
Pruyn, former Admissions Rep., Alta College), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/me-
dialdoc/Pruyn.pdf.
232. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong.
2-13 (2010) (attachments to the testimony of Joshua Pruyn, former Admissions Rep., Alta
College), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pruyn %20Attachments.pdf.
233. Id. at 2-3, 9-10, 12.
234. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong.
1-3 (2010) (testimony of Joshua Pruyn, former Admissions Rep., Alta Coll.), available at
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pruyn.pdf (recalling how counselors were told to en-
roll a student as long as they had a GED and $100).
235. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir.
2005) (articulating concern regarding unchecked violations of the incentive compensation
bans).
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The DOE's new rules remove the safe harbors and require schools to
review their recruitment methods; but loop holes and ambiguities persist.
First, the legal significance of PPAs in relation to the False Claims Act is
not clarified. Determination that statements contained in the PPA sub-
ject schools to liability under the False Claims Act would create another
safeguard against abuses and place more pressure on schools to comply.
Second, the final Program Integrity rules exempt payments made to third
party lead-generation websites from regulatory protection under incen-
tive compensation bans.2 3 6 In doing nothing to curb lead-generation
websites, no steps are taken to shield students from the overzealous con-
tact methods used by recruiters.2 37
The overarching goal of the DOE is to push for-profit institutions of
higher education into enrolling well-informed students who will benefit
from programs without placing such a high incentive on obtaining enroll-
ment numbers.2 3 8 While this intention has merit, due to the catch-22 of
the for-profit colleges, it is highly unlikely that these schools will abandon
their profit model altogether. The catch-22 of the for-profit model cre-
ates a distressing problem, but without an understanding of the overall
impact of these behaviors, the discussion cannot be complete.
V. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS BY
FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES
When a student chooses to attend a for-profit college without complete
information, it is not only the student who suffers, but the American tax-
payer as well. 2 3 9 Tuition rates at for-profit colleges average more than
five hundred percent of tuition at community colleges and two hundred
percent of tuition at four-year state universities. 24 0 Students attending
236. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,950 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(iii)(B)(2)) (exempting third parties as long as they take
no action to pre-qualify the student).
237. See Joshua Woods, Opportunity, Ease, Encouragement, and Shame: A Short
Course in Pitching For-Profit Education, CHRON. or HIGHER Eiuc., TIHE CHIRON. RiV.,
Jan. 13, 2006, at 10.
238. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration Proposes Student
Aid Rules to Protect Borrowers and Taxpayers; Key Elements of Gainful Employment on
a Separate Track (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/student-aid-rules-
protect-borrowers-and-taxpayers.
239. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 43,622 (proposed
July 26, 2010).
240. Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, Euuc., LABOR ANI) PEN-
SIONS, 111m CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW oF GRowrt, SPENDING, STUDENT
DEBT AND UNANSWERE) QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFIT HIGHIER EDucATION: HEARING
BEFORE TIHE S. COMM. ON HEALTH, Eouc., LA3OR AND PENsIONs 8-9 (Comm. Print
2010), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdfl4c23515814dca.pdf.
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for-profit colleges assume more debt than their counterparts.2 4 in fact,
almost one hundred percent of students at for-profits graduate with debt,
and almost a quarter of them graduate with over $40,000 in debt. 2 4 2
Some financial experts feel student loan defaults will be the next eco-
nomic bubble to burst.2 43
Ten percent of all students attending college are enrolled at for-profits,
but these students' loan default rate accounts for forty-four percent of the
federal student loans in default. 24 4 This disparity in default rates reflects
the increased levels of debt entered into by students who often graduate
without a meaningful degree. 2 45 As discussed above, the issue is com-
pounded by the fact that these students are already disadvantaged eco-
nomically and are more likely to be minorities or single parents.2 46
High levels of student debt have been shown to impact the student and
the public in three main ways.2 47 These are: (1) the financial burden on
241. Id.
242. Id. at 9.
243. Subprime Goes to College: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health. Educ., Labor
and Pensions, 111th Cong. 3 (Jun. 24, 2010) (testimony of Steven Eisman, Portfolio Man-
ager, FrontPoint Financial Services Fund), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Eisman.pdf.
244. See Tom HARKIN, CHAIRMAN 01 S. COMM. ON HEAL TH, Ecuc., LABOR ANI)
PENSIONS, 111-I-I1 CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVRVIEW OF GROWTII, SPENDING, STu-
DENT DEBT ANID UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROF-rr HIGHER EDUCATION: HEAR-
ING BEFORE TlE S. COMM. ON HEALTHI, Eiuc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 11 (Comm. Print
2010), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf (reflecting
the default numbers for students beginning repayment in 2007 and defaulting by 2009).
The GAO reports that eighteen percent of for-profit graduates default on their Title IV
loans. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 43,618 (proposed July
26, 2010). This figure only includes students who actually complete a degree. Id. The
default rate of students attending non-profit schools is almost a quarter of this default rate.
Id.
245. See TOM HARKIN, CHAIRMAN OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, Eouc., LA3OR1 AND
PENSIONS, 111111 CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTII, SPENDING, ST-
DENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PoFrr HIGHER EIUCATION: HEAR-
ING BEFORE TlE S. COMM. ON HE ALXH, Eouc., LABOR AND PENSIONS 9 (Comm. Print
2010), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca.pdf.
246. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDuc. STATISTICS, PROFILE OF UNDERGRADUATE STuoDNFIS:
2007-08, 60, 77, 81, 89 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pub-
sinfo.asp?pubid=2010205 (providing data on undergraduate student demographics). Ad-
ding to the concern about increasing default rates is the financial stability of the publicly
traded for-profits. See Steve Eisman, Portfolio Manager, FrontPoint Fin. Servs. Fund,
Presentation at the Ira Sohn Conference: Subprime Goes to College 6-7 (May 26, 2010),
http://insidehighered.com/content/download/350088/4329742/version/1/file/EismanSohn-
Conference.doc. The impact of default rates on stock prices and short sellers in the market
place create a worry for some analysts. See id.
247. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 43,621 (July 26,
2010).
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the individual; (2) the expense of loan subsidies to taxpayers; and (3) the
negative effect of defaults on the individual and the taxpayer.248 Simply
put, an individual facing the burden of a large debt does not have dispos-
able income, and therefore, the individual is less likely to make purchases
or save.2 4 9 A student who undertakes student loan debt after careful con-
sideration of pertinent facts poses no public policy concern-in terms of
the burden on the individual-because he or she is aware of the conse-
quences.2 50 When a student makes decisions enticed by the availability of
federal funds and is informed through misrepresentation, the government
should take steps to protect the student. One way to do this is by ensur-
ing the student has access to the most complete and accurate information,
which is a key goal of the new Program Integrity rules.25 1
The second concern of high debt burden is the cost to taxpayers.2 5 2
This view considers the fact that taxpayers subsidize Title IV federal
loans. 2 5 3 When a student is unemployed or faces financial hardship, the
student may request a deferment or forbearance of loans; this results in
the government waiving interest payments.25 4 While deferments are ben-
eficial for the individual, taxpayers absorb the cost.2 5 5 These costs can
rise to almost twenty percent of the total loan cost.2 5 6
The third cost consideration is the impact of defaulting on both the
individual and the taxpayer.2 57 In 2009, taxpayers absorbed over nine
billion dollars in student loan defaults. 2 58 This number increases the fed-
eral deficit and creates severe consequences for the student. A student's
credit rating is destroyed, he or she may be prohibited from obtaining a
professional license, his or her future wages may be garnished, tax re-
funds may be seized, and the individual will not qualify for future student
loans.2 59
248. Id.
249. See id. at 43,621-22.
250. Id. at 43,621.
251. Id. at 43,621; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Proposed Rule Links
Federal Student Aid to Loan Repayment Rates and Debt-to-Earnings Levels for Career
College Graduates (July 23, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/proposed-rule-
links-federal-student-aid-loan-repayment-rates-and-debt-earnings.
252. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 43,621 (July 26,
2010).
253. Id. at 43,621-22.
254. Id. at 43,622.
255. Id.
256. Id. (stating that cost of a three-year deferment can be up to twenty percent of the
loan value).
257. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 43,621-22 (July 26,
2010).
258. Id. at 43,622.
259. Id.
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The DOE proposed regulations to control the default rate and debt
burden of for-profit students in July of 2010.260 The proposed Gainful
Employment regulations seek to tackle the problem in a twofold man-
ner.2 6 ' The first test applies a debt-to-income ratio to determine if a stu-
dents' income allows him or her to make payments on the loan.2 62 The
second proposed test is repayment rate.26 3 This test considers the repay-
ment of all students who have loans originating from the institution, re-
gardless of program completion.2 6 4
When the DOE released the final Program Integrity rules on October
28, 2010, it failed to release final Gainful Employment, stating the desire
to hold additional public hearings.2 65 Concerns regarding the impact of
these regulations on the for-profit industry spurred intense lobbying ef-
forts in hopes of persuading the DOE to abandon the proposal.26 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The final Program Integrity rules promulgated by the DOE take a step
forward in offering students protection from fraud and deceptive prac-
tices of for-profit colleges. They demand greater accountability and
260. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Proposed Rule Links Federal Student Aid to
Loan Repayment Rates and Debt-to-Earnings Levels for Career College Graduates (July
23, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/proposed-rule-links-federal-
student-aid-loan-repayment-rates-and-debt-earnings.
261. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 43,618 (proposed
July 26, 2010) (summarizing proposed regulations devised to determine if a for-profit is in
fact offering an education that will lead to gainful employment). Institutions that pass both
tests or have a low debt-to-income ratio will maintain Title IV eligibility, while schools that
fail one test will be considered restricted, unless the school exhibits a high repayment rate.
Id.
262. Id. (the calculation includes payments from students who have not graduated and
considers discretionary income as well as actual income). The proposed regulation pro-
vides that payments must be less than eight percent of income "or twenty percent or less of
discretionary income" in order to meet the test. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. A school with a repayment rate of at least forty-five percent would be consid-
ered eligible for Title IV funding, while a school with less than thirty-five percent would be
ineligible. Id.
265. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Department on Track to Implement Gainful
Employment Regulations; New Schedule Provides Additional Time to Consider Extensive
Public Input (Sept. 24, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/depart-
ment-track-implement-gainful-employment-regulations-new-schedule-provides-.
266. Tamar Lewin, Scrutiny and Suits Take a Toll on For-Profit College Company,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at Al, available at 2010 WLNR 22437213. The Washington Post
Company, owner of Kaplan University, singlehandedly spent $350,000 on lobbying efforts
during the third quarter of 2010. Id. Under the proposed regulations, Kaplan would face
adverse action by the DOE, as seventy-two percent of Kaplan students are currently in
default. Id.
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transparency from for-profit schools and seek to rein in misrepresenta-
tion and reduce unmanageable student debt.
To some extent all institutions of higher education are "for-profit," but
as discussed above, the primary goal of for-profit colleges is financial
gain.2 6 7 Administrators and shareholders of for-profit schools seek to
profit personally from the educational endeavor.2 68 Over the past two
decades, publicly traded for-profit institutions have emerged as the most
visible and consequential players in the proprietary education industry.26 9
These schools face the additional pressure of meeting the expectations of
Wall Street and for many years were the darlings of the Street.2 70 For-
profit schools function as a business. Instead of selling widgets, they sell
the promise of a better future, doing whatever is necessary to achieve
annual enrollment and profit goals.
To meet financial goals, schools have resorted to fraud and misrepre-
sentation, in violation of their PPAs with the DOE. Schools work the
federal student loan system by fraudulently managing student data, and
deceiving students into enrolling by inflating career prospects and mis-
stating program costs. Additionally, schools model their admission repre-
sentatives' pay after a traditional sales environment, where compensation
is tied to enrollments. While many of the players in the industry provide
students with a beneficial educational experience, the bad actors draw
attention and scrutiny to the sector.
Undercover investigations conducted by the GAO exposed first-hand
instances of fraud and misrepresentation.2 7 1 Similarly, three Senate hear-
ings showcased anecdotal evidence of financial aid manipulation, misrep-
resentation of program costs and accreditation, and flagrant violations of
the incentive compensation ban. These deceptive practices, the high debt
levels of for-profit students, and increased student loan default rates
prompted the DOE's new Program Integrity and Gainful Employment
rules. Only time will tell if these new rules will finally curtail the abuses
seen in the for-profit education sector.
267. RICHARD Rucii, HicIHiR ED, INC. 92 (2001).
268. Id. at 13-14, 92.
269. Id. at 2-4.
270. See Joshua Woods, Opportunity, Ease, Encouragement, and Shame: A Short
Course in Pitching For-Profit Education, ClIR1ON. O! HIGHEAR EDUC., THE CHIRON. R13v.,
Jan. 13, 2006, at 10.
271. Undercover Testing finds Colleges Encouraged Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive
and Questionable Marketing Practices: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health. Educ., La-
bor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 2 (Aug. 4, 2010 revised Nov. 30, 2010) (statement of Greg-
ory D. Kuntz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S.
Government Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
dl0948t.pdf.
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Congress believed the 1992 Higher Education Amendments would
curb the destructive behavior of the for-profit colleges. But rather than
fixing the issues, the DOE altered their rules, creating ambiguity in the
administration of the policies. In response to increased regulation,
schools devised new methods to manipulate the federal student aid pro-
grams. Further amendments in 1998, 2005, and 2008 sought to contain
these behaviors while offering the for-profit industry conciliatory mea-
sures such as increasing the Title IV revenue threshold from eighty-five
percent to ninety percent, and eliminating the online education restric-
tion. In spite of these actions, the fraudulent practices continued.
Complaints to the DOE by students, Qui Tam suits, and shareholder
derivative suits have accelerated over the past ten years. The DOE inves-
tigators and state Attorneys General find it difficult to prosecute or inves-
tigate the large number of complaints filed against the for-profits.2 7 2 And
in instances when actions are brought against for-profit colleges, the vic-
tories are Pyrrhic.
Schools quickly offer to settle claims, agreeing to pay fines in return for
the DOE looking the other way. Though payment of penalties may im-
pact a school's financial statement, they do not change the practices of
the institution. The DOE is authorized to revoke or suspend an institu-
tion's access to Title IV funding but is reluctant to do so. A publicly
traded school with profits rivaling major financial services and manufac-
turing companies can easily absorb multi-million dollar fines but would
face disaster if the DOE withheld Title IV funding.27 3
It is understandable that the DOE refrains from causing financial col-
lapse of a major corporation. This ineffective enforcement needs to be
addressed and the DOE must adopt policies that provide consequences
for regulatory and statutory violations. The proposed Gainful Employ-
ment provisions suggest denial of funding for individual programs at
schools that do not meet the debt-equity ratio or consistently fall below
the forty-five percent repayment rate. If enacted and enforced, this could
provide actual consequences to programs that fail to deliver worthwhile
education. Perhaps it is because these regulations, as proposed, will actu-
272. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th
Cong. 5-6 (June 24, 2010) (testimony of Kathleen S. Tighe, Inspector General, U.S. De-
partment of Education), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/Tighe.pdf.
273. See Joshua Woods, Opportunity, Ease, Encouragement, and Shame: A Short
Course in Pitching For-Profit Education, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDuc., THE CHRON. REV.,
Jan. 13, 2006, at 10 (comparing the earning of the largest for-profit college with Oracle).
There are many stories of large companies making decisions to violate laws or regulations
cognizant of the fines that may be assessed. In business, this is considered an informed
decision, where penalties or lawsuits will cost less in the long run than compliance with the
law in question.
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ally affect schools, that the DOE has gone back to the negotiation table,
bending from lobbying pressure on the Hill.
If the DOE significantly weakens the proposed regulations or fails to
pass any significant default and debt guidelines, all will not be lost. The
structures established in the new regulations concerning Gainful Employ-
ment and Program Integrity remedy the prior ambiguity of the regula-
tions, but alternate mechanisms of enforcement should still be
considered. Statutory creation of an independent cause of action, and a
definitive decision that PPAs are enforceable under the False Claims Act
would place increased pressure on schools.
Another option that would penalize schools, without devastating the
business model, is the instatement of partial Title IV funding revocation
rather than requiring payment of lump sum fines. By adopting a proce-
dure in which schools found in violation of DOE regulations receive a
temporary loss of funding for new students only-with the ability for stu-
dents to receive retroactive payments if violations are fixed within a given
time-the DOE will be able to impact the bottom line of the institutions
while putting the schools in control of their continued viability. This op-
tion would impact the schools without causing bankruptcy.
The goal of all parties involved in the crafting of the Program Integrity
rules is to provide protection for low-income students seeking a way to
improve their lives through education. The challenge is balancing the
need to protect students without destabilizing what has become a signifi-
cant industry. The DOE's Program Integrity rules provide transparency
that will give students the information necessary to make informed deci-
sions. If schools follow the new regulations, students will have the ability
to take control of their educational decisions and will be less likely to
succumb to predatory practices. With the attention of schools diverted
from aggressive tactics, hopefully they will turn their attention to their
most important job: education.27 4
274. Although no one is sure if the new Program Integrity rules will actually make a
difference in the way for-profit colleges are run, the publicity surrounding the issue has
already severely impacted the industry's key players. UOP reported a potential forty per-
cent decline in enrollments between the Fall of 2010 and 2011. Goldie Blumenstyk, As
For-Profit Colleges' Enrollment Growth Slows, Analysts See Signs of an Industry Reset,
CHIRONICLEI OF HioHERi EDUC., Nov. 11, 2010, available at http://chronicle.com/article/For-
Profit-Colleges-May-Be-at/125379/. Strayer Education is admitting to a two percent de-
cline in students. Id. Most illustrative is the fact that Corinthian Colleges lowered their
earnings forecast by over twenty cents a share and made reductions to their workforce.
Corinthian Colleges, Bos. GLoE, Feb. 2, 2011, at 10, 2011 WLNR 2061806.
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